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The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and 
practitioners about the appropriate standard for evaluating the conduct of monopo-
lists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible 
standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic 
utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative 
benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This 
Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, 
and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare norma-
tive approach to section 2 since the formative era of antitrust law. Moreover, this 
Article will show that the commitment to maximizing total social wealth is not a 
recent phenomenon associated with Robert Bork and the Chicago School of anti-
trust analysis. Instead, it was the Harvard School that led the charge for a total 
welfare approach to antitrust generally and under section 2 in particular. The nor-
mative consensus between Chicago and Harvard and parallel case law is by no 
means an accident; rather, it reflects a deeply rooted desire to protect practices-
particularly "competition on the merits"-that produce significant benefits in the 
form of enhanced resource allocation, without regard to the ultimate impact on 
purchasers in the monopolized market. Those who advocate repudiation of the 
longstanding scholarly and judicial consensus reflected in the total welfare 
approach to section 2 analysis bear the heavy burden of explaining why courts 
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should, despite considerations of stare decisis, suddenly reverse themselves and 
adopt such a different approach for the very first time, over a century after passage 
of the Act. 
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INTRODUCI'ION 
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among anti-
trust scholars and practitioners about the appropriate standard for 
evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. Many of these individuals have advocated a "no economic sense" 
test, under which courts ask whether the monopolist's conduct would 
have been economically rational for the firm in question without 
regard to its exclusionary impact. Others have proposed a more intru-
sive "consumer welfare balancing test," under which courts seek to 
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determine the net impact of a monopolist's conduct on purchasers in 
the relevant market. Under this approach, courts would ban any con-
duct that reduced the welfare of such purchasers, without regard to 
the conduct's overall impact on the welfare of society. 
Most of the debate about these and other possible standards has 
focused on their economic utility. In the lexicon of antitrust policy, 
debate has centered on the question of which test produces the 
optimal mix of false positives (instances in which courts condemn con-
duct they should not) and false negatives (cases in which courts fail to 
condemn conduct they should). This debate is largely empirical, with 
the outcome depending upon factors such as the competence of courts 
at interpreting complex economic data, the impact of various stan-
dards-including the availability of treble damages-upon primary 
conduct, and the extent to which economic forces-for example, the 
entry of new competitors-will undermine monopolies that courts 
mistakenly decline to condemn. 
Lurking in the background, though, is a more fundamental ques-
tion, the answer to which necessarily determines what counts as a false 
negative or a false positive: What is it that renders conduct properly 
subject to condemnation in the first place? There are several possible 
answers to this question. For some, the mere fact that a monopolist's 
conduct injures a rival may suffice to establish unlawful monopoliza-
tion.l This "populist" or "producer welfare" standard would thus con-
demn a firm that, for instance, obtains a monopoly by realizing 
economies of scale that allow it to underprice its smaller rivals. Others 
would only condemn conduct that reduces the total wealth of society, 
regardless of its impact on rivals or purchasers in the relevant market. 
Under this "total welfare" approach, which is generally attributed to 
Robert Bork and the Chicago School of antitrust analysis? the same 
firm could underprice its rivals, drive them from the market, and 
increase prices above the preexisting level, so long as the productive 
1 Cf Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (condemning maximum 
resale price maintenance agreements because, inter alia, practice could disadvantage small 
dealers unable to realize efficiencies necessary to adhere to prices set by such agreements), 
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (suggesting that efficiencies that would result from merger mili-
tated against transaction because new entity would outcompete smaller rivals). As noted 
later, the populist or producer welfare approach has fallen out of favor with the Court and 
many scholars. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
2 See RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978) [hereinafter BoRK, 
AmrrRusT PARADox] (articulating economic model informing total welfare approach); 
Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 
(1966) [hereinafter Bork, Legislative Intent] (examining legislative history and concluding 
that, in passing Sherman Act, Congress favored total welfare framework); see also infra 
note 149 (collecting authorities attributing this view primarily to Bork). 
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efficiencies from economies of scale outweigh the so-called "dead-
weight loss" resulting from the misallocation of resources flowing 
from the resulting monopoly power. A third group would ban all con-
duct by a monopolist that reduces the welfare of purchasers in the 
market that the defendant has purportedly monopolized, even if such 
conduct increases society's overall welfare.3 Under this middle-ground 
"purchaser welfare" standard, the acquisition of monopoly due to 
economies of scale would be unlawful whenever purchasers in the rel-
evant market pay higher prices, even if the benefits of these econo-
mies far outweigh the deadweight loss associated with monopoly 
pricing. In any event, the choice among the standards is inescapably 
normative: Neither economic theory nor empirical inquiry can make 
this choice for courts or the rest of society. 
Whether a particular result counts as a false negative or a false 
positive depends upon which normative premise one chooses. For 
instance, condemnation of a restraint that injures rivals but increases 
the welfare of purchasers and the rest of society will result in a false 
positive for those who embrace the purchaser welfare or total welfare 
benchmarks. However, the failure to condemn such conduct will pro-
duce a false negative for those operating under a framework focused 
on the welfare of the monopolist's rivals. Likewise, for those who 
embrace a purchaser welfare standard, validation of a restraint that 
increases society's total wealth will lead to a false negative if the 
restraint nonetheless slightly increases the prices paid by purchasers in 
the relevant market. At the same time, condemnation of such a 
restraint will produce a false positive if the operative standard is the 
maximization of total social welfare. 
Despite the pivotal nature of this choice between normative 
premises, scholars and others who advocate various tests for section 2 
3 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (arguing 
that legislative history of Sherman Act demonstrates concern with harm to purchasers, not 
allocative efficiency); Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at 
the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 217 (2005) [hereinafter Pitofsky, 
Antitrust Enforcement) (endorsing comparison of efficiency effects with adverse impacts on 
consumers); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed 
Profit Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311,329-33 (2006) (endorsing so-called "con-
sumer welfare effect standard" whereby courts determine whether restraint on balance 
injures purchasers in relevant market); Robert Pitofsky, Testimony at a Public Hearing of 
the Antitrust Modernization Commission 97-99 (Sept. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Pitofsky, 
Testimony], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/ 
050929_Exclus_Conduct_Transcript_reform.pdf (endorsing balancing test where ultimate 
touchstone is "welfare of consumers," i.e., well-being of purchasers in relevant market); see 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 147, 148 
(2005) (advocating test whereby court weighs harm to purchasers against benefits of chal-
lenged practice and bans practice when harms are disproportionate to benefits). 
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liability generally avoid meaningful examination of this question. 
Some argue that their preferred test should apply regardless of which 
normative framework one accepts.4 Others-including leading 
enforcement officials-casually assert that their proposed approach is 
consistent with the purported normative framework underlying a 
mere handful of Supreme Court and circuit court precedents or that 
the normative premise underlying section 2 should automatically rep-
licate that applied under section 1,5 where courts at least purport to 
balance a restraint's benefits against any harms imposed upon pur-
chasers in that market.6 Still others proceed without any apparent rec-
ognition that the test for analyzing alleged monopolistic conduct could 
turn on the choice between competing normative frameworks. 7 
Another scholar claims that the case law is ambiguous on the issue of 
4 See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclu-
sionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389-93 (2006) 
(providing arguments for "sacrifice test" that span justifications underlying different nor-
mative premises and arguing that test "reflects widely shared normative intuitions"). 
5 See Jonathan A. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, "No Economic Sense" Makes No Sense 
for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779,793 (2006) (citing only three Supreme Court 
and appellate court cases in support of argument against "no economic sense" test); 
Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (invoking single Supreme Court case 
and single appellate court decision as basis for proposed balancing test); Pitofsky, Testi-
mony, supra note 3, at 5 (same); Salop, supra note 3, at 333-35; see also Christine A. 
Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust 
Enforcement in This Challenging Era, 11-14 (May 12, 2009), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.pdf (reading two Supreme Court decisions as 
requiring determination of "whether on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's) conduct 
harms competition and consumers" and ignoring numerous decisions taking different 
approach). 
6 Whereas section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on anticompetitive single-firm con-
duct, section 1 bans only concerted action "in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006); 
see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,767-78 (1984) ("The 
conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone .... "). Section 1 claims are generally 
judged under the "rule of reason" test first described in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 
221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911), and later applied in many section 1 cases. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111-13 (1984) (holding that benefits purport-
edly produced by restraint did not counterbalance harms for purposes of section 1 rule-of-
reason analysis given factual finding that restraint resulted in prices higher than they other-
wise would have been). 
7 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, 
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8 GEo. MASON L. REv. 1, 30-36 (1999) (defending pre-
ferred test without attempting to justify particular welfare standard); Marina Lao, Defining 
Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The Case for Non-universal Standards, 2006 
FoRDHAM CoMPETITION L. INST. 433, 434-35 (deriving commendably precise section 2 
standards without recognizing specific role of normative premises); see also ANTITRUST 
Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, CoMPETITION AND MoNOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CoNDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 oF THE SHERMAN Acr passim (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
reports/236681.pdf (withdrawn Apr. 2009) (repeatedly invoking "consumer welfare" as 
touchstone of section 2 analysis without articulating definition of that term). 
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normative premises.8 Finally, some scholars make arguments that 
depend upon one framework or the other without expressly 
embracing or justifying their chosen premise.9 
There are, of course, various ways to determine which normative 
standard should apply in evaluating a monopolist's conduct and thus 
in assessing the validity of various tests. For instance, one could eval-
uate each standard in light of some independent moral criterion, such 
as utility maximization, inherent justice, or the consequences of 
various standards for the health of our political system.10 Such an 
approach would inevitably require one first to explain why the chosen 
criterion is preferable to others. Or, one could take the more mun-
dane approach of discerning the original meaning of section 2-that 
is, determining which particular standard Congress meant courts to 
apply. Over the past few decades, antitrust scholars have expended 
considerable energy in attempting to discern the original meaning that 
Congress attributed to the term "monopolize" in section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.ll 
This Article undertakes a somewhat different inquiry, one that 
fills a significant gap in the scholarly literature: What is the normative 
8 Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a 
Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 21-23 (2004) (contending that case law is not clear on 
which effects matter when examining conduct by monopolist that both creates market 
power and produces benefits). 
9 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 15-16 
(1984) (resting argument for relatively permissive antitrust rules on unelaborated assump-
tion that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly pricing). 
10 For instance, some scholars have embraced a form of economic democracy as a 
moral criterion, arguing that protecting smaller, less efficient firms from more efficient 
rivals can preserve a decentralized marketplace and thus reduce the risk of corporate fas-
cism. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 
1053-54 (1979) (suggesting that some monopolies could have disruptive political effects). It 
should be noted that a "total utility" standard might produce results different from those 
produced by a "total economic welfare" standard, particularly if one assumes a diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth. For instance, a merger to monopoly that increases total eco-
nomic welfare by producing economies of scale may nonetheless reduce overall social 
utility by transferring a significant share of income from poor consumers to the rich share-
holders of the resulting monopoly. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Effi-
ciency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 105, 108-09 (1969). But see Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1704 (1986) ("The obser-
vation that money is worth different amounts at the margin to different people could as 
easily direct income toward the 'utility monster' (the person who gets fabulous pleasure 
from oodles of extra money or from gruesome deeds) as toward consumers or small 
businesses."). 
11 See, e.g., David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, G1 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1219, 1275-92 (1988) (describing political and economic assumptions that shaped 
Congress's view of meaning of Sherman Act); Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 
26-31 (arguing that concerns about consumer welfare and efficiency were central to legisla-
tors' understanding of Sherman Act's prohibitions). 
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framework that courts actually have chosen when adjudicating section 
2 cases? The Article concludes that, despite some twists and turns 
along the way, courts have not embraced purchaser welfare as the fun-
damental value underlying section 2. Indeed, the author is aware of no 
decision in which a court implementing section 2 has employed pur-
chaser welfare as the operative standard. At the same time, courts 
have repeatedly adopted tests that effectively implement a total wel-
fare approach to antitrust regulation. 
The Article also evaluates the claim, made by those who support 
a purchaser welfare approach, that support for the total welfare 
approach originated with, and is limited to, Robert Bork and the 
Chicago School of antitrust. To be sure, Bork has been the most vocif-
erous proponent of a total welfare approach to antitrust law. How-
ever, the modern total welfare approach enjoys much broader 
academic support and deeper roots than its opponents care to admit. 
This Article traces the origins of the total welfare standard to the 
influential Harvard School of antitrust analysis, which can in turn 
trace its origins to the late 1930s and the work of Edward Mason, then 
a leading member of the Harvard Economics Department. The 
Harvard School treated antitrust law as a vehicle for implementing 
neoclassical price theory's industrial organization paradigm as a 
means of ensuring an allocation of productive resources that maxi-
mized overall economic welfare.12 This school of thought, which 
included Mason disciples Carl Kaysen, Donald Turner, and Joe Bain, 
exercised significant influence on antitrust law both directly and indi-
rectly via the work of Phillip Areeda, Turner's co-author during the 
1970s. 
While Harvard and Chicago have on occasion supported different 
rules governing particular categories of conduct, particularly under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, their disagreements often rest on dif-
ferent appraisals of the economic impact of particular conduct and not 
on different normative premises. Moreover, with regard to section 2, 
the normative consensus between Chicago and Harvard and parallel 
case law is by no means ambiguous or accidental: It reflects a well-
considered and deeply rooted desire to protect practices-particularly 
"competition on the merits"-that produce significant benefits in the 
form of enhanced resource allocation, without regard to the ultimate 
impact of the practice on purchasers in the particular market served 
by the monopolist. Those who advocate repudiation of the long-
standing scholarly and judicial consensus reflected in the total welfare 
approach to section 2 analysis bear the heavy burden of explaining 
12 See infra Part IV.B. 
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why courts should, despite considerations of stare decisis, suddenly 
reverse themselves and adopt such a different approach for the very 
first time, over a century after passage of the Act. 
Part I of this Article describes three possible normative 
frameworks that courts could adopt when implementing section 2 and 
briefly explains the consequences of each for antitrust doctrine. The 
choice between these frameworks largely depends upon what counts 
as harm for the purposes of the antitrust laws. Part II examines the 
normative framework courts adopted in the formative era of antitrust 
law-1890 through the 1920s-particularly as illustrated by the first 
iteration of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. 13 Part III 
examines the most intrusive approach to section 2 that a court has 
adopted. Decided shortly after World War II, United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America14 (Alcoa) implicitly rejected the total wel-
fare approach to section 2 embraced during the formative era. Yet 
Judge Hand, Alcoa's author, did not embrace a purchaser welfare 
approach, endorsing instead an approach designed to further the 
noneconomic values of decentralization and deconcentration. Part IV 
describes the Harvard School's embrace of a total welfare approach, 
derived from the workable competition model of neoclassical price 
theory. This approach, it is shown, found its way into section 2 doc-
trine in the reprise of United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. ,15 in 
which the presiding judge relied on a special law clerk from the 
Harvard School in announcing a distinction between "competition 
based on pure merit," including the realization of economies of scale 
on the one hand, and "conscious business policies," such as exclu-
sionary agreements, on the other. The former was lawful per se, 
without regard to the impact upon purchaser welfare; the latter was 
unlawful. The decision's creation of a safe harbor for competition on 
the merits set the tone for modem monopolization doctrine, a sensi-
bility reinforced by the Harvard School's future academic work, which 
repeatedly reiterated United Shoe's determination that competition 
on the merits should be lawful per se, even when such conduct led to 
higher prices for purchasers in the relevant market. Part V describes 
modem section 2 doctrine, which continues to adopt a total welfare 
standard, again at the behest of the Harvard School. This Part also 
explains why such doctrine has an especially strong claim under the 
principle of stare decisis. Part VI examines and finds wanting two pos-
sible counterarguments against this Article's claim that section 2 l~w 
13 247 u.s. 32 (1918). 
14 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
15 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
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rests upon a total welfare foundation. The total welfare standard is 
not, as some claim, an exception that applies to a small subset of con-
duct by monopolists but is instead the rule that applies to all conduct 
that courts analyze under section 2. Further, the recent decision in 
United States v. Microsoft Corp. ,16 with its invocation of standards 
derived from section 1 's rule of reason, did not in any way undermine 
the judicial commitment to total welfare as the operative section 2 
standard. 
I 
WHAT's HARM AND WHAT's NoT: 
SECTION 2's PossiBLE NoRMATIVE PREMISES AND 
WHY THE CHOICE OF PREMISE MATTERS 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids "monopoliz[ation]" and 
"attempt(s] to monopolize."17 From the beginning, antitrust courts 
have required plaintiffs invoking section 2 to prove two elements: 1) 
that the defendant possesses monopoly power in a relevant, properly 
defined market, and 2) that the defendant has acquired or maintained 
that power by means of exclusionary conduct.18 Thus, mere possession 
of a monopoly, even a durable one, does not violate section 2.19 
Instead, a defendant must have also employed some undesirable, i.e., 
"exclusionary," conduct to acquire or maintain that power.20 
As a conceptual matter, analysis of a monopolist's conduct entails 
two discrete questions. First, what resulting effects render conduct 
undesirable? And second, what effects does that conduct actually pro-
duce? Economic theory and related techniques of empirical investiga-
tion can help answer the second question by informing courts about 
the effects that conduct has in the real world. At the same time, 
although economic theory can suggest different normative premises, it 
cannot itself answer the first question; that is, it cannot tell courts 
16 253 F.3d 34 {D.C. Cir. 2001). 
17 15 u.s.c. § 2 (2006). 
18 See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480-81 
{1992); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 {1966); see also Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 {1985) (quoting instructions to 
this effect with approval). 
19 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 {1911) (stating that Sherman 
Act does not forbid "monopoly in the concrete"). 
zo See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (stating that 
section 2 does not make mere size an offense); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 
247 U.S. 32, 69 (1918) (stating that section 2 does not forbid normal conduct that preserves 
monopoly); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-79 (1911) (stating that 
section 2 only forbids "undu[e]" restraints that lead to or protect monopoly). 
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which effects constitute the sort of harm that section 2 is designed to 
police.21 
Antitrust scholars have articulated three possible organizing nor-
mative principles that could drive antitrust doctrine. The "populist" or 
"producer welfare" school argues that the Sherman Act, including 
section 2, bans any conduct that restrains the autonomy of traders or 
results in a concentrated marketplace.22 Under this approach, tying or 
exclusive dealing agreements should be unlawful without more if 
entered into by a monopolist because such agreements restrain 
dealers and disadvantage the firm's rivals.23 By the same token, 
above-cost pricing that drives less efficient firms from the market 
would also violate section 2, even if such pricing reduced the prices 
paid by purchasers in the relevant market over the short, medium, and 
long term.24 
On the opposite extreme are those who advocate a "total wel-
fare" approach to the Act. These scholars and jurists contend that 
antitrust law bans only those contracts or practices that reduce 
society's overall economic welfare.25 Under this approach, values such 
as autonomy and decentralization are irrelevant-only wealth mat-
ters.26 Also under this approach, conduct that creates wealth on bal-
ance should be lawful even if purchasers in the relevant market pay 
higher prices as a result of the practice. For these proponents, the only 
2l See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYS IN Posi-
TIVE EcoNOMICS 1, 5-8 (1953) (explaining how positive economics can inform policy judg-
ments but cannot itself tell policymakers what normative principles to embrace). 
22 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 
CoRNELL L. REv. 1140, 1147 (1981) (concluding that Sherman Act was designed in part to 
protect small firms from power of trusts); id. at 1184 (endorsing per se rule against vertical 
minimum and maximum price fixing because "sellers of goods should have the freedom to 
charge the price they see fit"). 
23 See Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Information 
Failure as Soul or Hook, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759, 759-61 (1994) (articulating this vision of 
section 2). 
24 See, e.g., Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 
(9th Cir. 1970) (finding violation of section 2 in efficiency-based forward integration that 
injured rivals); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (treating 
above-cost maximum price-setting as harmful for section 1 purposes), overruled by State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
25 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15; see also Easterbrook, 
supra note 10, at 1703 ("[T]he dominant theme [of the legislative history] is the protection 
of consumers from overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on 
'efficiency.' There are differences at the margins, such as what if anything to do about price 
discrimination ... but the differences are not very important."). 
26 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15 (arguing that "all antitrust 
problems" turn on "only two factors"-"allocative inefficiency and productive efficiency"); 
see also Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1703 (arguing that statements in legislative history 
of Sherman Act evincing concern for welfare of small firms were "a sideshow"). 
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cognizable harm for antitrust purposes is what economists call the 
"deadweight loss"-the loss in total economic welfare that occurs 
when the exercise of monopoly power results in higher prices, lower 
consumption, and an incremental reduction in output.27 This welfare 
loss, in turn, equals the difference between the value that consumers 
would have placed on the foregone output and the cost of producing 
it. Because this cost reflects the value of the next best use of the pro-
ductive resources in question, the difference between value and cost 
represents a misallocation of resources to other, less valuable uses.28 
The classic example of conduct that increases total wealth while 
increasing purchaser prices-that is, conduct that would not violate 
section 2 under a total welfare approach-is a merger to monopoly 
that enhances the remaining firm's market power and increases prices 
in the relevant market, but also results in productive efficiencies that 
outweigh the deadweight losses that result from additional market 
power.29 Indeed, Professor Oliver Williamson has shown that a 
merger to monopoly that reduces production costs by one or two per-
cent may create more wealth than it destroys, even if the transaction 
results in higher prices in the relevant market.30 
Under a third approach, what this Article calls the purchaser wel-
fare standard, courts should ban all conduct that creates market power 
and thus raises prices that parties pay in the relevant market.31 It does 
not matter for these scholars if a practice produces benefits that coun-
terbalance allocative losses and thus enhances total welfare. Congress, 
these scholars say, passed the Sherman Act to provide purchasers with 
a legal entitlement to purchase goods and services at low prices.32 For 
these scholars, proof that conduct produces efficiencies is only rele-
vant if those efficiencies counteract any price effects and prevent the 
27 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 108 (noting that deadweight loss 
diagram "can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems"). 
28 /d. at 107-10; see also F.M. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-17 (1970) (describing how monopoly pricing results in inefficient 
allocation of resources). 
29 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOx, supra note 2, at 107-10 (invoking allocative ineffi-
ciency-productive efficiency tradeoff model as paradigmatic approach to all antitrust 
problems). 
30 See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 
58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18, 22-23 (1968). 
31 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Pro-
tecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 201, 203 
(2008); Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected 
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1989) (endorsing Professor Lande's reading of Act's 
legislative history to support purchaser welfare theory). 
32 See Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96 (arguing that Congress was concerned with ability 
to '"unfairly' extract wealth from consumers," not allocative efficiency). 
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conduct in question from increasing prices or, better yet, reduce such 
prices.33 
Though once deemed controversial,34 the purchaser welfare stan-
dard has gained ground in recent years. At the same time, support for 
the populist or producer welfare standard seems to have waned signif-
icantly in recent years, leaving the total welfare and purchaser welfare 
approaches as the most likely rivals for the best account of section 2.35 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the rivalry between these two 
vtews. 
The distinction between the purchaser welfare and total welfare 
standards is not always apparent. For one thing, both schools agree on 
numerous doctrinal results; for example, both support the absolute 
prohibition of cartel agreements.36 Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, both camps have described their goals using the same 
label: the maximization of consumer welfare.37 However, despite this 
common label, the respective schools embrace quite distinct princi-
ples. One camp would protect the welfare of all consumers, including 
those who are also shareholders in large firms with market power.38 
33 See Salop, supra note 3, at 317-18, 330-31; cf Alan A. Fisher, Frederick I. Johnson 
& Robert H. Lande, Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REv. 777, 785-88 
(1989) (advocating similar approach in merger context). 
34 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 279 (1986) (opining that 
treatment of "monopoly transfer" from producers to consumers as aspect of consumer 
welfare is "controversial"). 
35 Indeed, one prominent and former supporter of the populist approach to the 
Sherman Act has more recently advocated a purchaser welfare approach. Compare 
Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (endorsing comparison of efficiency 
effects with adverse effects on purchasers), and Pitofsky, Testimony, supra note 3, at 97-99 
(endorsing balancing test where ultimate touchstone is welfare of consumers, i.e., pur-
chasers in the relevant market), with Pitofsky, supra note 10, at 1051 {advocating approach 
whereby courts consider political values such as decentralization of power when con-
structing antitrust doctrine). 
36 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 66-67 (discussing per se ban on 
price fixing); Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion: Fixing 
Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 941, 944-46 (same); see also Easterbrook, 
supra note 10, at 1703 (noting that there are only "differences at the margins" between 
purchaser welfare and total welfare approaches). Both schools of thought would also, by 
their own terms, ban mergers that create market power without creating any offsetting 
efficiencies as well as mergers that create efficiencies so trivial that they do not offset the 
deadweight losses created by the transaction. 
37 See Salop, supra note 3, at 331 (conceding that "consumer harm" might be better 
term for his proposed standard than "consumer welfare"). Compare id. at 329-35 (repeat-
edly invoking "consumer welfare" to refer to welfare of purchasers in monopolist's 
market), with Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, passim {repeatedly using "consumer 
welfare" to refer to overall welfare of all consumers, including shareholders of 
defendants). 
38 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that shareholders of 
monopolists are also consumers and that their welfare should count for antitrust purposes). 
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The other camp, by contrast, would protect only the welfare of those 
consumers who happen to be purchasers in the market in which the 
defendant is operating at the time of litigation.39 As a result, this 
Article has, for the sake of exposition, renamed the schools and 
employs the neutral and more precise terms "total welfare" and "pur-
chaser welfare" to denote the normative premises embraced by these 
competing camps. 
The total welfare and purchaser welfare standards naturally sug-
gest different tests for determining whether a monopolist's conduct 
should be condemned. If administrative costs were zero, courts would 
simply examine challenged conduct with care and determine whether 
it enhanced the welfare of purchasers or society as a whole, depending 
upon the normative standard selected. However, administrative costs 
are real; courts cannot simply replicate a flawless economic analysis in 
every antitrust case.40 Thus, antitrust rules are necessarily imperfect 
efforts to implement a particular normative standard in light of the 
limited institutional capacities of courts.41 That is to say, a rule may 
seek to implement a particular normative standard without actually 
condemning every instance of conduct that offends that standard in 
the real world. 
Recent debate over a particular test for liability illustrates the 
role that both normative and administrative concerns can play in 
debates over appropriate liability rules and highlights the possible 
consequences of choosing one normative standard over another. Sev-
eral scholars have advocated a "no economic sense" test, whereby a 
monopolist only violates section 2 if its conduct "would make no eco-
nomic sense for the defendant but for the tendency to eliminate or 
lessen competition."42 Under this test, a monopolist will avoid liability 
if its conduct produces nontrivial benefits that would explain its 
behavior in the absence of monopoly power or the desire to protect or 
obtain it.43 While proponents of the test rarely invoke a specific nor-
mative standard,44 the test most plausibly reflects a total welfare 
39 See Salop, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing harm to consumers in context of specific 
market). 
40 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITI Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(discussing practical constraints on court's economic investigation imposed by administra-
tive costs). 
41 See id. Uustifying existence of per se antitrust violations based on "the administrative 
virtues of simplicity"). 
42 Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No 
Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413 (2006). 
43 Id. at 415-17. 
44 Werden, for instance, invokes "consumer welfare" as the object of the test without 
defining that term. See, e.g., id. at 415, 419. 
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approach. In particular, the test's safe harbor for conduct that creates 
significant benefits can be seen as reflecting an assumption, consistent 
with Professor Williamson's tradeoff analysis, that the benefits of non-
trivial efficiencies generally will outweigh any deadweight losses 
resulting from enhanced market power.45 Although the harmful 
effects of market power and misallocation may sometimes 
predominate, the cost of isolating such instances is presumably greater 
than the benefits of doing so. 
To be sure, some have argued that, in light of administrative 
costs, the "no economic sense" test is also the best vehicle for imple-
menting a purchaser welfare normative standard.46 These scholars 
argue that close scrutiny of a monopolist's conduct would chill benefi-
cial innovation and the realization of efficiencies, thereby harming the 
monopolist's purchasers in the long run.47 At the same time, these 
scholars generally reserve this argument for specific types of conduct, 
such as pricing and output decisions,48 while advocating a competing 
and more intrusive "consumer welfare balancing test" to examine 
other practices that purportedly raise greater risk of harm to pur-
chasers, such as exclusionary agreements.49 Under this so-called con-
sumer welfare balancing test, courts examine directly whether such 
practices, on balance, injure purchasers in the relevant market, in the 
same way that courts purportedly "balance" the benefits of challenged 
agreements against resulting harms when conducting a rule-of-reason 
analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act.50 
Arguments for a "no economic sense" test based on a purchaser 
welfare standard are necessarily contingent upon contestable pessi-
mistic assumptions about the capacity of advocates, courts, and agen-
45 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 15-16 (resting argument for relatively permissive 
antitrust rules on assumption that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly 
pricing); see also supra note 29-30 and accompanying text (describing Williamson's 
tradeoff analysis). 
46 See, e.g., Lao, supra note 7, at 461-62 (arguing that, for certain forms of conduct, 
proof of procompetitive benefits should serve as "absolute" affirmative defense, regardless 
even of availability of alternatives that are less harmful to purchasers). 
47 See, e.g., id. (reasoning that too much scrutiny will hinder "product redesign and 
development decisions"). 
48 See, e.g., id. at 462-63. 
49 See, e.g., id. at 456-58, 461-62 (advocating purchaser welfare balancing test for 
monopolist's distribution strategies on theory that such conduct poses greater risk of 
overall harm to purchasers than purely unilateral pricing decisions). 
50 See Salop, supra note 3, at 329-35 (endorsing what amounts to consumer welfare 
balancing test whereby courts determine whether restraint on balance injures purchasers in 
relevant market); Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 (endorsing compar-
ison of efficiency gains with adverse effects on purchasers); see also infra notes 309-11, 316 
and accompanying text (discussing purported balancing test akin to rule-of-reason 
analysis). 
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cies to distinguish beneficial conduct from that which creates harm 
and to quantify the positive and negative consequences of such con-
duct.51 In September 2008, the Department of Justice's Antitrust 
Division rejected the purchaser welfare effects test for exactly these 
reasons.52 Just eight months and one presidential election later, the 
Division reversed itself, apparently embracing a purchaser welfare 
effects test and rejecting the sort of administrative concerns that had 
motivated the 2008 conclusion.53 Thus, it seems plain that the selec-
tion of one normative standard over another can have a significant 
and perhaps dispositive impact on the choice between possible tests 
for evaluating a monopolist's conduct. 
II 
ToTAL WELFARE IN THE FoRMATIVE ERA 
A. The Safe Harbor for "Normal" Conduct and the 
Efficient Monopolist 
Proponents of a total welfare account of section 2 doctrine can 
trace the theory's roots back almost a century to Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States54 and United States v. American Tobacco Co. ,55 decided 
in the same month in 1911. These and subsequent decisions during 
antitrust law's formative era embraced standards that were consistent 
with a total welfare approach-and inconsistent with a purchaser wel-
fare standard-to section 2, at least in those industries in which firms 
could acquire and maintain monopoly power by engaging in efficient 
conduct. Moreover, as explained in subsequent Parts, the section 2 
standards announced during the formative era survive to this day and 
apply even in those industries in which firms may acquire and main-
tain permanent monopoly power by means of conduct that is unam-
biguously beneficial. 
51 Adjudicatory and forensic techniques may even evolve in response to the choice of a 
particular standard. Cf. Williamson, supra note 10, at 113 (contending that recognition of 
efficiency defense in merger context would cause parties and others to develop new tech-
niques measuring impact of such transactions). 
52 See CoMPETITION AND MoNOPOLY, supra note 7, at 37-38 (noting criticism of 
"effects-balancing test" as "not easily administrable"). 
53 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on 
Antimonopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_ 
releases/2009/245710.htm (announcing and explaining rationale for withdrawal); Varney, 
supra note 5, at 11-14 (explaining withdrawal of Section 2 Report and endorsing test that 
determines "whether on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's] conduct harms competi-
tion and consumers"). 
54 221 u.s. 1 (1911). 
55 221 u.s. 106 (1911). 
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Like earlier formative-era decisions, both Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco read sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act narrowly 
so as not to infringe upon liberty of contract.56 Some have even criti-
cized the decisions on this ground.57 During this era, the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments placed meaningful 
limits on the ability of Congress and the states to regulate private eco-
nomic activity, including pricing decisions and commercial contracts.58 
56 Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179-80; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58-63; see also Alan J. 
Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1, 34-67 (1999) 
(detailing influence of liberty of contract considerations on Sherman Act doctrine from 
1890 unti119ll); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at 
58 (1996) ("Standard Oil can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of individual lib-
erty, its vision of a private sphere defined in opposition to a public, majoritarian domain."). 
Some have suggested that Standard Oil's invocation of and reliance upon liberty of 
contract to narrow the scope of the Sherman Act was a departure from earlier case law 
which, it is said, preferred a more interventionist approach that banned any restraint of 
trade without regard to reasonableness. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 85-97 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (contending that earlier case law and terms of statute rejected rule of reason); 
Edwin S. Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VA. L. REv. 355, 369 (1932) 
(characterizing Standard Oil as "judicial legislation" on these grounds); Millon, supra note 
11, at 1288 n.314 (claiming that early decisions applied statute literally, and Standard Oil 
changed that course); PERITZ, supra, at 26-29, 50--58 (contending that early case law 
rejected liberty of contract in favor of more expansive interpretation of Sherman Act but 
that Standard Oil reversed course of earlier decisions). 
However, as I have argued elsewhere, the reasonableness approach taken by the 
Standard Oil Court was entirely consistent with previous Sherman Act case law. Meese, 
supra, at 12; see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 64-65 (explaining that previous decisions 
had implicitly resorted to reason when looking to "nature" and "character" of challenged 
contracts); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898) (stating that 
section 1 of Sherman Act does not forbid restraints of trade where effect is "indirect or 
incidental only" because Act "must have a reasonable construction or else there would 
scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that could not be said to have, 
indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it" 
(quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))); Robert H. Bork, The Rule 
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 
801--05 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason I] (arguing that substance of law was not 
changed at all in Standard Oil); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAw AND EcoNOMIC PoucY IN 
AMERICA: THE EvoLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr 265 (1956) (arguing that 
White's opinion in Standard Oil changed nothing). Moreover, William Howard Taft agreed 
that Standard Oil was entirely consistent with previous case law. See Cline v. Frink Dairy 
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (stating that Standard Oil "fully confirmed" 
earlier case law); WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, THE ANTITRUST Acr AND THE SuPREME 
CouRT 89 (1914) ("[T]hose who charged that the court had narrowed the act, or had not 
comprehended the settled public opinion that found expression in it, spoke without 
knowledge."). 
57 See Corwin, supra note 56, at 367-71 (criticizing Court's decision as "predetermined 
result"). 
58 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (voiding federal statute 
that outlawed discharge of employees due to labor union membership); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (voiding state maximum hours legislation); Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (voiding state effort to regulate terms of insurance 
contract entered in another state). 
June 2010] DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT 675 
As a result, the Court said, the Sherman Act does not ban so-called 
"normal" or "ordinary" contracts or combinations, even if they 
restrain trade as a matter of plain meaning.59 Indeed, the Court said, a 
ban on such agreements would grind interstate commerce to a halt 
and destroy contractual liberty instead of facilitating its exercise, as 
intended.60 Moreover, the Court said, the Sherman Act did not forbid 
"monopoly in the concrete," but, instead, only monopoly acquired or 
maintained by means of "undu[e]" or "improper[]" tactics.61 In so 
doing, the Court reached the result presaged almost a decade earlier 
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, where the controlling vote 
opined that the rights to own and dispose of property and to make 
ordinary contracts place significant limits on the scope of the Sherman 
Act, including section 2, with the result that the Act bans only unrea-
sonable restraints.62 
The implication of these decisions seems obvious: While firms 
may not obtain or sustain monopoly power via undue restraints, they 
may do so via restraints or other tactics that are "ordinary," "normal," 
or "due." Moreover, while the Court did not define the category of 
59 Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 183; see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60 (arguing that, 
despite language that was "broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract," 
Sherman Act "necessarily called for the exercise of judgment" in evaluating challenged 
agreements); see also Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 568 ("An agreement entered into for 
the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no 
purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly 
restrain such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the Act, although the agreement 
may indirectly and remotely affect that commerce."). 
60 See Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 180 (stating that Standard Oil Court gave term 
"'restraint of trade' ... a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract 
and render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate 
commerce"); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (noting that literal application of statute "would 
be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to 
subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce"); Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 
567-68 (reading Act narrowly lest it ban all manner of normal and ordinary contracts); see 
also Whitwell v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1903) (Sanborn, J.) 
("There is nothing in the [Sherman Act] which deprived any of these competitors of these 
rights [of contract]. If there had been, the law itself would have destroyed competition 
more effectually than any contracts or combinations of persons or of corporations could 
possibly have stifled it."). 
61 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 ("[T]he omission of any direct prohibition against 
monopoly in the concrete ... indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual 
right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for 
the prevention of monopoly .... "); see also Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179 ("It was there-
fore pointed out [in Standard Oil] that the statute did not forbid or restrain the power to 
make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, 
whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose."). 
62 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring) ("[T]he general language of the 
[Sherman] [A]ct is also limited by the power which each individual has to manage his own 
property and determine the place and manner of its investment. Freedom of action in these 
respects is among the inalienable rights of every citizen."). 
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"normal" or "ordinary" conduct with great precision, close analysis 
suggests the Court had in mind practices that a firm would have 
adopted without regard to whether it possessed or expected monopoly 
power.63 Or, as the Court put it in Standard Oil, the statute did not 
ban those contracts "entered into or performed with the legitimate 
purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing 
trade .... "64 While such agreements might incidentally obtain or sus-
tain a monopoly, they were nonetheless normal or usual and thus 
lawful.65 It seems, therefore, that a restraint could be normal or ordi-
nary under the Standard Oil formulation even if it (incidentally) facili-
tated the exercise of market power to the detriment of purchasers in 
the relevant market. 
The Court confirmed this reading of "normal" or "ordinary" just 
seven years after Standard Oil and American Tobacco in United States 
v. United Shoe Machinery Co.66 There, the United States argued that 
the defendant had monopolized the market for shoe machinery, first 
by merging with several rivals, and then by adopting various purport-
edly exclusionary practices that helped United Shoe acquire and 
maintain its monopoly. These practices included United Shoe's policy 
of leasing its machines instead of selling them outright, as well as its 
use of so-called "full capacity clauses," which required lessees to 
employ machines leased from United Shoe whenever the lessee had 
work appropriate for United's machines, in preference to those pur-
chased or leased from others.67 The firm also required lessees to 
employ its aftermarket maintenance and repair service, and it pro-
vided these services free of charge.68 
63 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 77, 83-89 (making this argument in more detail); see also Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 
U.S. at 568 (holding that Sherman Act only reaches contracts whose main purpose is to 
restrain trade). 
64 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58; see also id. at 55-56 (explaining with approval English 
legislation repealing bans on engrossing and forestalling, because acts condemned by such 
statutes "tended to fructify and develop trade" and that "an individual's right to trade 
could not be protected by destroying such right"). 
65 See Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 568 (defining as "indirect" those restraints entered 
"for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with 
no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly 
restrain such commerce"); United States v. Hopkins, 171 U.S. 578,600 (1898) (arguing that 
Sherman Act was not intended to cover indirect or remote effects on commerce). As I 
have explained elsewhere, the Joint Traffic Ass'n Court held that the Act does not ban 
"indirect" restraints as a means of avoiding regulation of what it called "ordinary contracts 
and combinations." Meese, supra note 56, at 53-54. 
66 247 u.s. 32 (1918). 
67 See id. at 61-63 (detailing various lease provisions challenged by United States). 
68 See id. at 56 ("There is a service force as well, estimated at 6,000 men, to repair 
immediately breaks or deterioration without extra charge."). 
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There was no doubt that such agreements disadvantaged rivals 
and thus protected the defendant's monopoly position in the shoe 
machinery market.69 Nonetheless, the Court considered this factor to 
be beside the point, finding that the agreements in question produced 
benefits independent of any propensity to obtain or maintain 
monopoly power.7° In particular, the Court described specific benefits 
created by the restraints and found that the transactions in question 
were motivated by considerations that "move[ ] and may move the 
transactions of men."71 Moreover, the Court also found it noteworthy 
that each of the firms that had merged to form the defendant had, 
before the merger, employed the very same restraints.72 The previous 
employment of such restraints in a less concentrated market appar-
ently suggested to the Court that the agreements produced benefits 
unrelated to the creation or maintenance of market power, i.e., they 
were "normal" or "usual," as the Standard Oil Court used those 
terms.73 It did not matter to the Court that the firm had become a 
monopoly, as such market dominance was "at once the result and 
69 Cf id. (noting that company had "magnitude," which was both "result and cause of 
efficiency"). 
70 That is to say, the decision was an application of what is now known as the "no 
economic sense" test. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 42 (articulating and arguing for this 
test); Melamed, supra note 4, at 389-92 (articulating so-called "sacrifice test," which is 
functionally equivalent to Werden's "no economic sense" test, supra, whereby conduct is 
deemed anticompetitive "if, but only if, it makes no business sense or is unprofitable for 
the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and resulting supracompetitive recoupment"). 
71 United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 65; see id. at 63-64 (explaining that practice of leasing 
machines helped finance entry of small shoe manufacturers and ensured that machines 
were used in proper relation to other machines); id. at 64 (explaining that requirement that 
lessees also lease accessory machines created "great economic advantage"); see also 
William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 
16-17 (1995) (explaining how United Shoe decision rested upon determination that chal-
lenged provisions were voluntary arrangements that benefitted both parties). 
72 See United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 63 ("As we have seen, the leasing of their respective 
machines was the practice of the constituent companies before their union and (the leases] 
were substantially the same after union as before-in instances better."). 
73 /d. at 65. Similarly, some modern courts and scholars have contended that restraints 
that arise in unconcentrated markets are presumptively efficient. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (finding that adoption by smaller firms of 
so-called "blanket licenses" suggested that such agreements produced benefits indepen-
dent of any market power and should thus be analyzed under rule of reason); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) 
(noting that absence of market power creates inference that challenged restraints produce 
efficiency benefits); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enter., 776 F.2d 185, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (stating that absence of market power suggests restraint is beneficial or 
benign); see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing 
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373,384-85 {1966) (hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason 
II] {"This inference that the price-fixing agreement enhances the efficiency of a contract 
integration may safely be taken as conclusive without proof ... since the apparent market 
share of the parties makes it highly improbable that the real purpose or effect of the 
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cause of efficiency."74 In more modern parlance, United Shoe was an 
efficient monopolist. The Court reiterated these principles into the 
1920s in its section 2 jurisprudence.75 
Viewed from a modern perspective, these paradigmatic decisions 
embrace the total welfare view of section 2 at the expense of the pur-
chaser welfare view. Long before there was a Chicago School of anti-
trust analysis, these decisions declined to interfere with monopolies-
and thus monopoly pricing-when the monopolist in question 
obtained or maintained its power by engaging in normal or ordinary 
practices that produced efficiencies. Such efficiencies, in turn, presum-
ably outweighed any deadweight loss resulting from enhanced 
monopoly power, thereby justifying validation of the practice.76 
"Mere size," without more, was not an offense, even if such size 
empowered a firm to charge monopoly prices. 77 
Moreover, such a result is consistent with-perhaps even com-
pelled by-the Supreme Court's more general attitude toward eco-
nomic regulation during this period.78 According to the Lochner-era 
Court, the unequal distribution of wealth was an inevitable conse-
quence of the state's fundamental obligation to protect what Madison 
had called the "faculties of acquiring property."79 This unequal distri-
arrangement is to restrict output."); Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 19-23 (proposing so-
called market power filter for restraints analyzed under rule of reason). 
74 United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 56. 
75 See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (stating that section 
2 of Sherman Act does not make "mere size" an offense); United States v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1920) (holding that defendant did not violate section 2 where 
"[i]t resorted to none of the brutalities or tyrannies that the cases illustrate of other combi-
nations"); id. at 450-51 (stating that mere size is not offense if obtained without exclu-
sionary tactics); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (noting that 
mere fact that restraint adopted by important industry participants alters prices does not 
render it unlawful); see also MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CoRPORATE REcONSTRucnoN oF 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 136 (1988) ("[During the formative era] a literal 
monopoly of manufacture or production achieved by a person or firm or corporation 
through superior efficiency, or through effective and otherwise lawful competition, or 
through expansion by the purchase of property, remained unobjectionable."). 
76 See Williamson, supra note 30, at 20-22 (contending that small increase in efficiency 
can outweigh allocative harm resulting from merger to monopoly). 
77 Int'l Harvester, 274 U.S. at 708; see also U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 440-41 (finding no 
violation of section 2 absent "brutalities or tyrannies"). 
78 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (noting that disparity in bargaining 
position does not justify legislative interference with liberty of contract); see generally 
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (holding that Congress cannot ban so-
called "yellow dog" contracts that prohibit employees from joining unions). 
79 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The 
protection of these faculties is the first object of government."); see also Coppage, 236 U.S. 
at 17 ("[I]t is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the 
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequali-
ties of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights."). 
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bution might confer bargaining power on the manufacturer, including 
the power to charge prices above (or provide wages below) the level 
that competition might produce.80 However, such power and the dis-
tribution of property that created it was the necessary result of a 
system of free contract and private property and could not itself justify 
regulation.81 
Although the state could regulate private commercial activity 
that fell within the "police power," this power has been described as 
the power to combat "externalities" and nothing more.82 Such power 
did not include the general authority to abridge liberty of contract for 
the bare purpose of transferring income from one class of individuals 
to another.83 Indeed, in Lochner itself, the Court characterized a law 
with such an objective as a "labor law," a demeaning epithet within 
the Lochner paradigm.84 While the state could regulate prices charged 
by firms "clothed with a public interest," such regulation simply inter-
dicted cartel or monopoly pricing that exercised market power (and 
thus misallocated resources) without any offsetting benefits.85 Absent 
80 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17 (conceding that parties will have different levels of bar-
gaining power). But cf Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgement, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice 
Souter and the Mistranslation of Liberty, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 3, 38-39 (1999) ("There 
is no logical relationship between an employer's wealth and its bargaining power."). Or, as 
Judge Easterbrook explained in the antitrust context: "A dollar yardstick never measured 
market power .... To show market power, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's 
sales loom so large ... that a reduction in output by the defendant could not quickly be 
made up by other firms' increased output." L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 
402, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.). 
81 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17; see also Page, supra note 71, at 15-17 (contending that 
United Shoe and other decisions of era reflected Coppage-like reasoning). 
82 See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 200 (1994) 
(explaining how scope of police power recognized in Lochner-era decisions replicated 
scope of externality regulation endorsed by classical economic paradigm); Meese, supra 
note 56, at 15-23 (describing scope of police power within classical economic paradigm 
that Lochner-era Court embraced). 
83 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLuM. L. REv. 873, 878 n.27 (1987) 
(explaining that Lochner-era jurisprudence rested upon strong preference for redistribu-
tion via generally applicable laws instead of regulation of private contracts); see also 
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557-59 (1923) (holding that state could not regu-
late wages to ensure health and welfare of employees because such welfare was not 
employers' responsibility). 
84 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("Viewed in the light of a purely labor 
law, with no reference whatsoever to the question of health, we think that a law like the 
one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that 
the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act."). 
85 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876). Compare Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 
747 (1878) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (reading Munn as approving price regulation where 
"practical monopoly" was of such importance that "a tribute can be exacted from the com-
munity," thereby creating "common charge" or "burden on the citizen"); with Charles 
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 524, 538-44 (1923) (Taft, 
C.J.) (holding that meatpacking factory was not sufficiently "clothed with a public interest" 
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any proof that a contract or other practice reduced overall welfare, a 
mere showing that the contract reflected a purportedly unfair bargain 
between the parties to it would not justify regulation under this para-
digm.s6 Under this view, purely normal business conduct that created 
efficiencies, thereby producing or fortifying a monopoly, would be 
beyond the scope of legitimate police power regulation and would 
thus be protected by liberty of contract. 87 
B. Two Possible Caveats 
There are, however, two caveats to any reliance upon formative-
era jurisprudence to support a "total welfare" approach to section 2. 
to justify wage regulation when plant had only 300 employees and $600,000 in capital stock, 
and there were "many other packing houses in Kansas, of greater capacity"). 
86 See Meese, supra note 56, at 83-86 (developing this argument in more detail). To be 
sure, the Lochner Court did sustain antitrust regulation that banned certain horizontal 
cartels again~t liberty of contract claims. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 
175 U.S. 211, 227-38 (1899) (holding that liberty of contract does not protect direct 
restraints of interstate trade forbidden by Sherman Act and finding that challenged cartel 
raised prices well above level that ordinary competition would produce and thus was 
"direct restraint"). Nonetheless, such cartel agreements were not "normal" conduct in the 
sense used here because they produced no benefits-aside from above-cost pricing by the 
defendants. See id. at 238-45 (finding that horizontal restraint that raised prices above 
competitive level deprived defendants of right of ordinary competition and directly 
restrained interstate commerce). Also, regulation of such restraints did more than simply 
transfer income from conspiring producers back to purchasers. It also eliminated the sort 
of deadweight allocative loss produced by naked cartel pricing, without destroying any 
offsetting efficiencies. Thus, these precedents do not indicate that Lochner-era courts could 
plausibly have read the Sherman Act to ban monopoly obtained by means of "normal" 
conduct. 
Some have argued that the framers of the Sherman Act could not have understood 
that cartel pricing would result in a misallocation of resources, citing the fact that Alfred 
Marshall did not publish his Principles of Economics, which first popularized the concepts 
of deadweight loss and allocative inefficiency, until 1890-the same year that Congress 
passed the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law and Economics, and the 
Courts, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 181,207--08 & n.140 (1987). As a result, these scholars 
conclude that Congress must have meant to ban above-cost pricing simply because it 
reduced the welfare of purchasers, without regard to any efficiencies created. However, 
Alfred Marshall was not the first economist to recognize that above-cost pricing could 
reduce total welfare. In 1776, Adam Smith argued that state-created monopolies would 
"derange" the "natural distribution of the stock [capital] of society" and that "every der-
angement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful to the society in which it 
takes place." AoAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 682-83 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994); see also E.G. West, The 
Burdens of Monopoly: Classical Versus Neoclassical, 44 S. EcoN. J. 829, 836-38 (1978) 
(arguing that Adam Smith understood allocative inefficiency as one burden of monopoly). 
In any event, this Article examines the content of case law, announced and enforced by 
judges, and not the intent of the Congress that passed the Sherman Act in 1890. 
87 See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (holding that 
Sherman Act does not reach "ordinary contracts and combinations" that restrain interstate 
commerce only indirectly). 
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First, an argument that this jurisprudence rejected a purchaser welfare 
version of section 2 rests upon the assumption that a firm can, in fact, 
acquire or maintain a monopoly and raise purchaser prices simply by 
engaging in what Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and United Shoe 
would call "normal conduct." Absent this assumption, there would be 
no such thing as an "efficient monopolist";88 all monopolies would be 
the product of at least some conduct that excludes rivals without pro-
ducing any benefits whatsoever. If so, then the era's safe harbor for 
"normal" conduct would not reflect a decision to reject a purchaser 
welfare standard, since such conduct could never, by itself, injure pur-
chaser welfare if it could not create or maintain a monopoly. 
However, modern antitrust scholars uniformly assume that a firm 
may obtain or maintain a monopoly simply by means of normal con-
duct.89 The paradigmatic example of such conduct is above-cost 
pricing that falls below competitors' prices (due perhaps to economies 
of scale) and that drives less efficient firms from the marketplace, 
thereby empowering the monopolist to raise prices.90 This is what is 
known as the "efficient monopolist." 
The assumption that there could be an efficient monopolist was, 
at the very least, controversial during the formative era. Indeed, 
according to the classical economic paradigm, which was ascendant in 
the nineteenth century, a firm could not maintain a monopoly absent 
some assistance from the state or the use of private violence.91 Adam 
88 See generally HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLICY 29-31 (3d ed. 
2005) (describing natural monopoly achieved because of economies of scale). 
89 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN & WARRENS. GRIMES, THE LAw oF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 73 (2000) (assuming that firms can achieve dominance by 
merit and concluding that current law does not interdict such monopolies); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1039-41 (2000) (listing 
forms of conduct that constitute "competition on the merits" and "are welcomed by the 
Sherman Act"); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and 
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 367,387-92 (2001) (arguing that false positives 
will deter societally productive conduct by monopolists); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identi-
fying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 824-28 
(2000) ("To punish a firm simply because it has achieved a monopoly is to discourage 
superior business performance."). 
90 See HovENKAMP, supra note 88, at 29-31. 
91 See HoVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 282-83 ("Within the classical paradigm, 
monopoly prices could never be earned ... unless people were artificially restrained from 
entering."); Meese, supra note 56, at 15-23 (detailing assumptions of classical paradigm 
and its conclusion that firms could not charge monopoly prices without state aid); see also, 
e.g., ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JuRISPRUDENCE 363 (R.L. Meek eta!. eds., 1978) ("[I]f 
any trade is overprofitable all throng into it till they bring it to the natural! price, that is, 
the maintenance of the person and the recompense of the risque he runs .... "); Thomas 
M. Cooley, Limits of State Control of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REv. 233, 259-60 
(1878) (contending that, absent state aid, firms could not price above competitive level 
unless they departed from "regular business" methods and resorted to "violence and 
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Smith had even suggested that those who feared the survival of 
monopoly without state assistance might just as well fear witchcraft.92 
This assumption was so powerful that it led some jurists to argue that 
price regulation of firms that had not received state aid was unconsti-
tutional, even if the regulated firms were colluding with one another 
in a concentrated market.93 According to these jurists, free entry 
would prevent incumbent firms from pricing above the competitive 
level, with the result that any regulation setting a price below that set 
by the market would necessarily confiscate a portion of the defen-
dant's property by preventing him or her from charging a reasonable 
price.94 
Formative-era courts seemed to reject the assumption that state 
assistance or independently tortious conduct was a sine qua non of 
successful cartelization or achievement of monopoly. To be sure, early 
decisions that banned cartel price-fixing by railroads emphasized that 
the parties to the cartel, like the defendants in Joint Traffic, had 
received special assistance from the state in the form of outright 
grants of land and delegation of the power of eminent domain.95 Such 
state-created advantages raised the cost of entry for firms that had not 
received such advantages.96 Still, less than ten years after the Sherman 
Act was passed, the Court banned horizontal price fixing among com-
terror"); George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspects of Trusts, 3 PoL. Sci. Q. 385, 
403 (1888) ("If the gates for the admission of new competitive capital are always open, the 
economic effect is substantially the same as if the new competitor were already there 
.... "). 
92 SMITH, supra note 86, at 570-72. 
93 See Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 548-52 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142-53 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting). In both Munn and Budd, the 
regulated firms had apparently agreed on common prices. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 131 
(explaining how prices charged and received for storage were agreed upon and established 
by different warehouses in Chicago from year to year). 
94 Budd, 143 U.S. at 548-52 (Brewer, J., dissenting); Munn, 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field, J., 
dissenting); see also LoUis D. BRANDEIS, Competition, in THE CuRsE OF BIGNESS 114 
(Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., Kennikat Press 1965) ("[N]o monopoly in private industry in 
America has yet been attained by efficiency alone."). It should be noted that at least some 
judges recognized that a firm might obtain what economists would now call a natural 
monopoly by realizing economies of scale. See People ex ret. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 
693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (referring to example of matchstick company 
that, because of greatness of its facilities, could make article cheaper and sell it at lower 
price than its competitors). However, these jurists also believed that capital was sufficiently 
mobile that, whenever a natural monopolist priced above normal level, another monopolist 
would immediately take its place. See Walsh, 22 N.E. at 693 (Peckham, J., dissenting) 
(opining that such monopoly could continue to exist only so long as other citizens chose to 
keep out of business). 
95 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569-71 (1898). 
96 See Meese, supra note 56, at 54-55 & n.270 (explaining how classical jurists assumed 
that grant of eminent domain raised barriers to entry and thus protected incumbent carte-
lists from competition). 
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peting firms simply because the cartel agreement had resulted in 
prices well above the firms' costs plus a reasonable rate of return.97 
The defendants had received no special benefits from the state and 
had not engaged in tortious activity that disadvantaged rivals. More-
over, in Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the Court condemned 
the defendants for obtaining and fortifying monopolies without any 
aid from the state, by means of conduct that was neither violent or 
tortious, on the one hand, nor normal or ordinary, on the other.98 That 
is to say, the Court recognized that firms could create and maintain a 
monopoly without state assistance or private violence.99 This recogni-
tion was consistent with the work of several economists of the era, 
who argued that very large firms could realize efficiencies not avail-
able to smaller entities.100 
At the same time, the Court still seemed to assume that purely 
normal conduct could not lead to anything more than a transient 
monopoly. When explaining why the Sherman Act did not forbid 
"monopoly in the concrete" or ban "normal" or "ordinary" contracts 
entered by defendants, the Standard Oil Court opined that the Act 
depended upon the assumption that protection of the right of all 
market participants to make normal and ordinary agreements of the 
sort protected by liberty of contract would itself prevent sustained 
monopoly: 
[T)he operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting 
from the right to freely contract was [according to the framers of the 
Sherman Act] the means by which monopoly would be inevitably 
prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no 
97 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-40 (1899) 
(rejecting claim that restraint was indirect based upon lower court's findings that arrange-
ment resulted in prices well above cost plus reasonable rate of return). The Court quoted 
extensively from then-Judge Taft's findings in the Sixth Circuit that the challenged cartel 
had charged unreasonable prices. See id. at 235-38 (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. 
United States, 85 F. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.)). 
98 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911) (finding that defendant 
dominated industry "not as a result of normal methods of industrial development, but by 
new means of combination which were resorted to in order that greater power might be 
added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed"); United 
States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) ("[T]he history of the combination is 
so replete with the doing of acts ... demonstrative ... of a purpose to acquire dominion 
and control of the tobacco trade, not by the mere exertion of the ordinary right to contract 
and to trade, but by methods devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving competi-
tors out of business."). 
99 See generally HoVENKAMP, supra note 82, at 268-95 (contending that rise of neoclas-
sical economics resulted in revised conception of "coercion" that justified additional 
regulation). 
100 /d. at 218-21 (describing increasing recognition by economists during this era that 
large combinations could create economies of scale). 
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right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency 
were permitted. In other words that freedom to contract was the 
essence of free!lom from undue restraint on the right to contract.101 
Thus, even if one firm employed ordinary or normal contracts to 
obtain a (temporary) monopoly, the right of others to employ the very 
same ordinary tactics would allow such other firms to enter the 
market and undermine that temporary monopoly.102 To the extent 
that the formative-era Court believed that efficient conduct could not, 
by itself, create or maintain a permanent monopoly, the safe harbor 
for "normal" or "ordinary" conduct would not necessarily depend 
upon a normative choice between purchaser welfare, on the one hand, 
and total welfare, on the other.l03 In this case, the Justices may have 
seen no conflict, as purely positive economics taught them that effi-
cient conduct could not by itself maintain a monopoly for long.l04 
Thus, such conduct would necessarily enhance the welfare of both 
purchasers and the rest of society. 
It is important not to overstate this point, however. Judicial 
assumptions aside, it seems clear that, as some contemporary scholars 
recognized, there were in fact efficient monopolists during this era 
such that the test applied under section 2 fostered efficient monopo-
lies to the detriment of purchaser welfare.105 Moreover, while deci-
sions such as Standard Oil assumed that monopolies obtained through 
efficiency were necessarily transient, others exhibited no such assump-
tion and, if anything, suggested the opposite. The United Shoe 
Machinery monopoly, for instance, had thrived for nearly two 
decades, maintained by conduct the Court held to be normal.l06 Nor 
did the rationale of the decision suggest or imply any expectation that 
the firm's monopoly would dissipate any time soon. One might even 
101 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62. 
102 See People ex rei. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 1889) (Peckham, J., dis-
senting) (opining that new entrant could displace natural monopoly if latter raised price 
above reasonable level). 
103 But cf United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 63-65 (1918) (holding 
that defendant had maintained its durable monopoly via purely normal tactics). 
104 Cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 5-6 (explaining how positive economics can inform 
policy judgments). 
105 See, e.g., Arthur T. Hadley, Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 Q.J. EcoN. 28, 
28 (1887) ("[C]orporations, in many instances, have a virtual monopoly in their own line of 
business, which is at variance with all our theories of industrial freedom .... Where large 
management is more economical and productive than small management, we shall find 
large concerns or none at all."). 
106 See United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 56 ("The company, indeed, has magnitude, but it is at 
once the result and cause of efficiency, and the charge that it has been oppressively used is 
not sustained .... There has been saving as well in the cost of manufacture of shoes."); id. 
at 65 ("We see nothing else in the circumstances of the parties than that which moves and 
may move the transactions of men."). 
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characterize United Shoe's more realistic approach as a bridge to 
modern decisions holding that competition on the merits and other 
forms of efficient conduct survive section 2 scrutiny,107 regardless of 
any impact on the welfare of purchasers in the relevant marketplace. 
This brings us to the second consideration that could undermine 
the force of the formative era's protection for "normal" conduct. 
Simply put, recognition that a particular doctrinal choice had its 
source in Lochner and its support for liberty of contract may not rec-
ommend it in the eyes of most scholars or lawyers. Lochner, after all, 
is generally viewed as a paradigmatic example of judicial activism, in 
which the Court identified and protected a right-liberty of con-
tract-found nowhere in the actual Constitution.108 And of course, 
the Supreme Court began to repudiate the doctrine of economic due 
process more than seven decades ago. 109 Thus, to the extent that deci-
sions such as United Shoe and Standard Oil were, in the Court's view, 
compelled by its liberty of contract jurisprudence, the repudiation of 
Lochner and its progeny would, some might argue, drain these deci-
sions of any precedential significance and require modern courts to 
look elsewhere for guidance when deciding which welfare standard to 
embrace under section 2.110 Some might therefore be dubious of 
efforts to derive the current meaning of the Sherman Act from 
formative-era decisions that read the Act to comply with constitu-
tional norms that have been repudiated. 
Nonetheless, there is little evidence that courts have found the 
formative-era cases corrupted by association with Lochner. After all, 
107 See infra Part IV.B (describing use of total welfare approach in second United Shoe 
case); Part V.B (discussing Court's acceptance of total welfare framework in modern 
cases). 
108 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint 
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (opining that Lochner was properly over-
ruled); id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). 
109 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (declining to examine whether ban on 
debt-adjusting by non-lawyers infringed liberty of contract); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (according only rational basis scrutiny to state law that prohibited 
opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without prescription from ophthalmologist or 
optometrist); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (finding Filled Milk 
Act, which prohibited shipment of certain ostensibly adulterated dairy products in inter-
state commerce, to be constitutional); W. Coast Hotels v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 38~00 
(1937) (upholding minimum wage statute over constitutional challenge), overruling Adkins 
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
110 At the same time, one could not plausibly argue that the repudiation of Lochner and 
its progeny mandates the rejection of a total welfare standard under section 2 once and for 
all. Congress may well have chosen or anticipated that courts would apply a total welfare 
standard under section 2, independent of any constitutional considerations. Indeed, Robert 
Bork, a fierce opponent of substantive due process-and thus of protection for liberty of 
contract-has argued exactly that, without invoking Lochner or its progeny. See infra Part 
IV.A (describing Bork's arguments to this effect). 
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while modern courts profess no love for liberty of contract and similar 
economic liberties, they repeatedly invoke Standard Oil as a founda-
tional decision from which they derive various antitrust principles, 
decades after Lochner and its progeny were cast aside. 111 Moreover, 
since Lochner's demise, Congress has been free to overrule Standard 
Oil by legislation but has declined to do so. The ignominy of Lochner 
notwithstanding, liberty of contract lives on in antitrust doctrine until 
Congress decides otherwise. 
III 
ALcoA's PoPULIST DETOUR 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to examine the develop-
ment of monopolization law without discussing Learned Hand's 
famous Alcoa decision. Repeatedly cited by courts, scholars, and 
advocates, the decision is often invoked for the proposition that so-
called "competition on the merits" cannot violate section 2. 
After Lochner's repudiation, Standard Oil-with its reliance on 
liberty of contract-itself fell into some disrepute as an exemplar of 
judicial activism and an unduly narrow interpretation of the Sherman 
Act.112 Soon thereafter, the scope of section 2 reached its maximum in 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 113 (Alcoa). There the 
United States claimed that Alcoa had maintained its lawfully-obtained 
monopoly through a variety of predatory tactics, including overbuying 
of bauxite and exclusionary contracts with suppliers of electricity.114 
The government also charged Alcoa with repeatedly expanding its 
capacity to meet new demand for its product, thereby preempting and 
discouraging new entry .115 At the same time, there was no allegation 
that Alcoa had priced its output of aluminum ingot below any mea-
sure of cost. 
The trial court found that Alcoa had not, in fact, entered exclu-
sionary agreements with input suppliers or engaged in other predatory 
111 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (citing 
Standard Oil approvingly for reasonableness standard); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978) (describing rule-of-reason analysis as rising out 
of Standard Oil); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) 
(referring with approval to Standard Oil as "landmark case" that articulated fundamental 
section 1 principles). 
112 See Corwin, supra note 56, at 366-69 (criticizing narrowness of Standard Oil Court's 
interpretation of Sherman Act). 
113 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
114 For instance, the government claimed that Alcoa purchased more bauxite than it 
required and also entered into exclusive agreements with firms that generated hydro-
power; both tactics were allegedly intended to prevent rivals from entering the market. See 
id. at 432-34 (describing these allegations). 
115 Id. at 430-31. 
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tactics and entered judgment for the defendant.116 Because several 
Justices of the Supreme Court recused themselves, the case was 
assigned to a panel of the Second Circuit to act for the Supreme 
Court. In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the court affirmed the 
trial court's factual findings with one or two minor exceptions.l17 This 
decision seemed to set up a clean question of law: whether a firm that 
maintained a monopoly solely via "normal" or "usual" conduct-
here, expanding to meet consumer demand-offended section 2. 
After determining that Alcoa was, in fact, a monopolist, Hand 
recognized that mere possession of a monopoly did not violate section 
2.118 Reviewing the authorities with great care, he acknowledged 
various decisions stating that the acquisition or maintenance of 
monopoly by means of ordinary or normal conduct did not, without 
more, violate section 2.119 And, he said, there was a strong argument 
for this position. After all, some firms may obtain a monopoly "merely 
by virtue of ... superior skill, foresight and industry."120 To be sure, 
the failure to intervene in such cases might "expose the public to the 
evils of monopoly."121 But such conduct was the very thing the 
Sherman Act was designed to encourage, so that any monopoly was 
"the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: 
finis opus coronat."122 Or, as Hand even more colorfully put it, "The 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be 
turned upon when he wins."123 
Scholars, judges, and practitioners alike have repeatedly quoted 
this language as evidence that Hand embraced a safe harbor for effi-
cient monopolists, thereby embracing, at least implicitly, a total wel-
fare test.124 And yet, Hand seemed to distance himself-and the law-
from this colorful phrasing, claiming that cases evincing this view were 
no longer good law.125 Instead of relying upon the larger body of 
116 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 44 F. Supp. 97, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
117 See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432-39 (affirming most of trial court's factual findings but 
reversing trial court's finding that Alcoa had not engaged in "price squeeze" that helped it 
acquire power in downstream market for sheet aluminum). 
118 See id. at 429 ("It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly, that it 
'monopolized' the ingot market: it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have 
been thrust upon it."). 
119 !d. at 429-30. 
12o !d. at 430. 
121 !d. 
122 /d. Finis opus coronat is traditionally translated as: "The end crowns the work." 
123 !d. 
124 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en bane) 
(per curiam) (quoting this statement with approval); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of 
Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (same); PHILLIP 
AREEDA & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAw 'li 622a (1978) (same). 
125 See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430. 
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formative-era case law, Hand cited a single Supreme Court decision 
for the proposition that a monopolist's size carried with it an opportu-
nity for abuse and that such abuse would violate section 2.126 He did 
not elaborate on the definition of "abuse." 
After suggesting that section 2 should not "turn[ ] upon" efficient 
monopolists, Hand seemed to do exactly that, condemning Alcoa 
because it had repeatedly expanded its output to meet the needs of 
consumers.127 As Hand put it: 
It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate increases 
in the demand for ingots and be prepared to supply them. Nothing 
compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before 
others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded competitors; 
but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively 
to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every 
newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organiza-
tion, having the advantage of experience, trade connections, and the 
elite of personne1.12s 
Hand did not claim that Alcoa had priced its output of ingot below 
any measure of cost or that Alcoa's conduct was only rational for a 
firm that possessed or hoped for market power. In short, Judge Hand 
condemned what modern antitrust courts and scholars would call 
"competition on the merits."129 
While Hand rejected a safe harbor for efficient monopolists, he 
did not embrace a purchaser welfare standard. At no point did he 
endorse balancing the conduct's costs or harms against its benefits or 
otherwise attempting to determine whether the exercise of "skill, fore-
sight and industry" that maintained Alcoa's monopoly enhanced or 
reduced purchaser prices. To the contrary, when examining whether 
Alcoa in fact possessed a monopoly, he noted that any comparison of 
costs and benefits of a firm's conduct, while proper under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, was out of bounds whenever "the contract is made 
with intent to set up a monopoly."130 Moreover, in discussing the 
rationale for the prohibition of monopoly, Judge Hand opined that 
Congress meant to ensure a particular, deconcentrated market struc-
126 /d. at 430 ("Mere size ... is not an offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified 
'to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly ... but size carries with it an opportunity 
for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in 
the past."' (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932))). 
127 ld. 
128 /d. at 431. 
129 See A. A. Poultry v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1403-04 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining that expanding to meet new demand is quintessential competition that law 
encourages); see also infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (describing judicial crea-
tion of safe harbor for competition on merits). 
130 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428. 
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ture, for reasons unrelated to costs and prices.131 In support of this 
assertion, Hand cited dicta in the Court's early decision in United 
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, suggesting that the Sherman 
Act was designed to protect "small dealers and worthy men" from 
cartels that reduced prices.l32 In this way, Judge Hand anticipated a 
similar conclusion by the Supreme Court more than a decade later in 
the context of mergers and section 1. In 1962, the Court suggested that 
the propensity of a merger to create efficiencies actually militated 
against it, since the transaction could disadvantage smaller firms.l33 
Four years later, the Court held that mergers would offend section 7 
of the Clayton Act if they produced a certain level of concentration, 
even if they resulted in lower consumer prices.134 Each decision cited 
Hand's assertion that the Sherman Act aimed at a decentralized 
market structure despite the possible cost of such a policy to pur-
chasers in the relevant market.l35 A few years later, the Court con-
demned maximum resale price maintenance, in part because the 
practice could injure inefficient dealers.l36 Thus, Hand rejected both 
total and purchaser welfare standards, in favor of a populist, producer 
welfare standard that advanced noneconomic values such as the 
decentralization of economic decisionmaking. 
131 See id. at 429 ("Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly 
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in 
spite of possible costs, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively com-
pete with each other."). 
132 See 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). The language in question was dicta because there was 
no allegation that the challenged cartel reduced prices or otherwise injured small dealers. 
Moreover, the actual rationale of the decision was quite narrow, holding that restraints 
between firms such as railroads that had received special privileges from the state were 
unlawful regardless of the reasonableness of the price set. See Meese, supra note 56, at 
43-46. 
133 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (recognizing 
Congress's "desire to promote competition through the protection of' small business even 
if that promotion came at expense of efficiencies and higher prices for consumers). 
134 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 
(2006) (banning anticompetitive mergers); Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381,403-13 (1980) (detailing this 
era's hostility toward mergers that disadvantaged rivals by reducing costs of newly-created 
firm). 
135 Von's, 384 U.S. at 275 n.9; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316 n.28. 
136 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (treating contract's propen-
sity to disadvantage smaller dealers by channeling distribution through larger, more effi-
cient dealers as harmful result), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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THE HARVARD ScHOOL, UNITED SHoE, AND THE 
TOTAL WELFARE STANDARD 
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Alcoa rejected both purchaser welfare and total welfare as the 
animating values of section 2. However, Hand's producer welfare 
vision of the Act has not fared well, either in academia or in the 
courts. Most scholars reject Hand's account as an inappropriate inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act,137 and the Supreme Court has taken a 
different approach as well.J38 Both the Court and most scholars have 
opined that the Sherman Act pursues "consumer welfare" to the 
exclusion of other values. At the same time, however, scholars disa-
gree about the appropriate definition of "consumer welfare." Some 
refer to purchaser welfare, that is, the welfare of purchasers in the 
market dominated by the monopolist.139 Others refer to total welfare, 
that is, the welfare of all consumers, whether or not they are partici-
pants in the relevant market.140 Moreover, proponents of the pur-
chaser welfare standard attribute the total welfare standard to Robert 
Bork and the Chicago School, with the effect-if not the intent-of 
downplaying the extent and longevity of support for this approach. As 
shown below, however, Bork and Chicago were latecomers to a total 
welfare standard, a standard that the Harvard School of antitrust anal-
ysis began to embrace in the work of Edward Mason, Carl Kaysen, 
and Donald Turner-over a decade before Bork. This work influ-
enced the pivotal decision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., another challenge to United Shoe's monopoly.141 For that case, 
Kaysen, a student of Mason, served as a special law clerk assisting a 
district judge in his efforts to evaluate a renewed challenge to conduct 
by a monopolist that had escaped condemnation just three decades 
earlier. The second United Shoe case created a safe harbor for "com-
petition based on pure merit," without regard to whether such con-
duct enhanced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market, 
consistent with the safe harbor for "normal" conduct recognized 
during the formative era. 
137 See AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 124, 'll 626b & n.14 (endorsing United Shoe 
formulation over that employed in Alcoa); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1703 (opining 
that legislative history suggesting concern for noneconomic values was "a sideshow"); infra 
Section A {detailing Bork's criticism of Alcoa opinion); infra Section B (detailing criticism 
of Alcoa by Kaysen, Mason, and Turner). 
138 See infra Part V.B (detailing Supreme Court's acceptance of total welfare approach). 
139 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
141 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
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A. Robert Bark's (Tardy) Attack on Alcoa 
Two decades after Alcoa, Robert Bork famously launched an 
attack on Judge Hand's account of the normative foundations of anti-
trust law as part of a larger examination of the original meaning of 
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Bork performed an 
exhaustive review of the Act's legislative history as well as the early 
case law.l42 Both sources, Bork said, pointed in the same direction: 
The Sherman Act did not empower courts to pursue social and polit-
ical values at the expense of purchasers.143 Bork did not, however, 
embrace a purchaser welfare standard, nor did any other members of 
the Chicago School. Instead, his critique of Hand rested on his conclu-
sion that Congress had meant courts to adopt antitrust standards that 
maximized what Bork called "consumer want satisfaction."144 In so 
doing, Bork drew upon neoclassical price theory, both to help model 
and explain business behavior and to supply the requisite normative 
framework. 145 Thus, Bork equated "want satisfaction" with the wel-
fare of all consumers or, in other words, society's total welfare (what 
he also called the "maximization of wealth"), and not just those con-
sumers who happened to purchase in the market where the defendant 
did business.146 There was, Bork said, no other conceivable value that 
142 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 11-47 (examining legislative history); 
Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 775, 781-829 (examining early case law). 
143 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 8-14 (summarizing Hand's view as well 
as Bork's basis for disagreement); id. at 26-31 (reaching this conclusion with respect to 
section 2 in particular); Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 781-829 (examining early 
case law); id. at 829-32 (arguing that "implicit in the approach of the main tradition" found 
in early case law "is the policy of assisting the economy to maximize wealth"). 
144 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7 ("My conclusion, drawn from the 
evidence in the Congressional Record, is that Congress intended the courts to implement 
(that is, take into account in the decision of cases) only that value we would today call 
consumer want satisfaction."); Bork, Rule of Reason /, supra note 56, at 829 (defining 
wealth maximization as "consumer want satisfaction"); id. at 830 ("[W]e can extrapolate 
[from the early cases] the policy that necessarily underlies the decisions ... even though 
that policy may never have been explicitly formulated in the judge's mind. The policy ... is 
the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction."); id. at 830-31 ("The disparity 
[between mergers and naked cartels] is indeed provocative but, as analysis demonstrates, it 
is far from anomalous .... The operative significance thus given to efficiency in the produc-
tion and distribution of goods and services necessarily derives from a desire to increase the 
wealth of the society."). 
145 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-10 (arguing that Williamson's 
tradeoff model can illustrate all antitrust problems); see also id. at 116-17 (contending that 
price theory is only methodology capable of informing rational antitrust policy); Richard 
A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 932 (1979) ("The 
Chicago School has largely prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper lens for 
viewing antitrust problems is price theory."). 
146 Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7; see Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Anti-
trust Policy, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 242, 245 (1967) [hereinafter Bork, Goals of Antitrust] 
(arguing that Sherman Act's "preference for competitive rather than monopolistic 
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could explain the distinctions formative-era courts and members of 
Congress had repeatedly drawn between naked cartels, on the one 
hand, and various forms of productive integration, on the other.147 
Under this approach, a practice that created wealth on balance would 
be lawful even if it injured the welfare of purchasers in the particular 
market in question.14S 
B. Bork's (Not So Distant) Ancestors: Edward Mason, Carl 
Kaysen, and the Reprise of United Shoe 
Some scholars attribute the total welfare approach to Robert 
Bork and the Chicago School (and only the Chicago School), with the 
effect of minimizing the apparent support for such a standard within 
the antitrust community at large.149 Bork is certainly a strong sup-
porter of the total welfare approach, having deployed several comple-
mentary arguments in its defense in four different works, starting in 
1965.150 Still, Bork began this defense over a decade after antitrust 
scholars in Cambridge, Massachusetts were embracing a total welfare 
standard. Thus, academic support for the total welfare approach is far 
more widespread and deeply rooted than its detractors might imagine. 
Before Bork attended law school, Edward Mason was busy 
founding the so-called "Harvard School" of antitrust policy.151 Begin-
resource allocation is ... based upon a desire to maximize output as consumers value it" 
and defining "consumer welfare" to require "minimizing restrictions of output and permit-
ting efficiency, however gained, to have its way"); Bork, Rule of Reason /,supra note 56, at 
829-30 (equating maximization of "consumer want satisfaction" with "maximization of 
wealth"). 
147 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 14-26 (discussing statements by legisla-
tors describing policy behind Act as well as proposed rules of law); Bork, Rule of Reason I, 
supra note 56, at 830 n.177 ("It seems difficult to imagine another value which would sug-
gest greater toleration for mergers than for cartels since, aside from their efficiency-
enhancing potential, mergers might seem less socially desirable."). 
148 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 7 (defending total welfare standard); see 
also BaRK, ANTITRusT PARADOX, supra note 2, at 107-15 (arguing that mergers that 
create efficiencies are good for society at large). 
149 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 22 (treating Bork as single representative of 
total welfare view); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 31, at 192-96 (attributing this view to 
Bork and other Chicagoans); Salop, supra note 3, at 329 n.68 (treating Bork as single rep-
resentative of total welfare standard); cf. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of 
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double 
Helix, 2007 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 42-43, 71 (noting that proponents of interventionist 
enforcement often attribute contrary view to purportedly extreme Chicago School while 
ignoring similar positions advanced by Harvard School). 
150 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 2, at 90-115 (arguing for total welfare 
approach); Bork, Goals of Antitrust, supra note 146, at 245 (same); Bork, Legislative 
Intent, supra note 2, at 7 (same); Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 829-31 (same). 
151 See Posner, supra note 145, 928 n.8 (stating that position of Harvard School "is well 
conveyed in the writings of Edward S. Mason"). There was, at the time Mason started 
writing, no "Chicago School" of antitrust policy. 
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ning in 1937, Mason authored a number of articles that developed a 
workable competition approach to industrial organization and anti-
trust theory.152 Adherents to "workable competition" rejected perfect 
competition-the foundation of neoclassical price theory-as a reli-
able jJenchmark for evaluating trade practices, recognizing that cer-
tain departures from perfect competition could actually generate 
more benefits than harms, despite resulting market power.l53 The 
classic example was economies of scale: In some industries technology 
was such that only relatively large firms could realize available effi-
ciencies, thereby inevitably producing a concentrated market struc-
ture conducive to market power and inconsistent with perfect 
competition.154 In language like that which Bork would employ nearly 
two decades later, Mason opined that competition was not an end in 
itself, but was instead desirable "for the results that are expected to 
follow from it," namely the "efficient use of resources."155 Working 
with a grant from the Merrill Foundation, Mason created an interdisci-
plinary working group in 1950 charged with "formulat[ing] a standard 
of workable competition."156 The group included participants from 
the Harvard Economics Department, Harvard Law School, and 
MIT.157 Two of the participants would co-author a leading monograph 
152 See EdwardS. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 46 (1937) 
[hereinafter Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics] ("[Some degree of] control is per-
fectly compatible with the existence of some degree of competition."); Edward S. Mason, 
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 
1266-71 & n.6 (1949) [hereinafter Mason, Current Status] (examining implications of work-
able competition model for various antitrust problems). 
153 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1266-67 ("From the point of view of 
economic policy, competition is supposedly desirable, not as an end in itself, but for the 
results that are expected to follow from it."). In addition to Mason's work, see, for 
example, John M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REv. 
241 (1940), which explains the shortcomings of perfect competition as a benchmark for 
antitrust policy, and JoHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR CoMPETITION 404-22 (1940), which 
calls for policies that further workable competition. See also Alan J. Meese, Monopoliza-
tion, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REv. 743, 772-93 (2005) 
(describing development of workable competition school, including role of Harvard 
scholars). 
154 See EDWARDS. MAsON, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in Eco. 
NOMIC CoNCENTRATION AND TilE MoNOPOLY PRoBLEM 382, 387-88 (1957) (arguing that 
when deciding what constitutes permissible versus impermissible monopolistic behavior, 
courts should take into account how that behavior affects "the organization and adminis-
tration of economic resources"); see also JoE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND 
EMPLOYMENT 112 (rev. ed. 1953) (arguing that "[i]n most industries a very small firm is 
quite inefficient" in light of unrealized economies of scale). 
155 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1266-67. 
156 See Nine Professors Named for Study of Monopoly Problems, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MoNITOR, July 10, 1950, at 13 (describing Mason's launch of five-year study). 
157 See Edward S. Mason, Preface to CARL KA YSEN & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST 
Poucv, at xi, xix n.ll (1959) (describing group and its membership). 
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on the economics of antitrust policy, with a preface by Mason 
describing the book as a manifestation of the working group's 
views.158 Another authored leading texts in price theory and industrial 
organization.159 
Like Bork would do more than fifteen years later, Mason argued 
in 1949 that Alcoa's holding swept too far. The decision, Mason said, 
threatened to ban ordinary competitive tactics like the expansion of 
productive capacity to meet demand and the concomitant realization 
of economies of scale.16o Other scholars would echo Mason's con-
cerns.l61 None of these scholars invoked or endorsed a purchaser wel-
fare standard. 
Nonetheless, buoyed by its success in Alcoa, the United States 
had challenged another monopolist, the United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation, in the District of Massachusetts. In so doing, the govern-
ment focused on conduct that post-dated its unsuccessful attack on the 
company three decades earlier.162 Invoking Alcoa, the United States 
sought to condemn United Shoe on the grounds that its consistent 
embrace of new opportunities was indicative of an intent to monopo-
lize.163 In addition, the government challenged a wide variety of the 
company's practices, including purely internal activities such as the 
introduction of new machines in response to competitive challenges, 
as well as aggressive research, development, and patenting.164 
Perplexed by what he termed the government's "scattershot 
case,"165 Judge Wyzanski sought help from, literally, the Harvard 
School of antitrust analysis. He contacted Mason, then the Dean of 
158 ld. at xix (describing influence of working group discussions on authors' conclusions 
and contending that monograph was result of joint effort by members of study group). 
159 See Joe S. Bain, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION); JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY {1952). 
160 See Mason, Current Status, supra note 152, at 1273 ("Although [the Alcoa] decision 
probably broke new legal ground, it is from an economist's point of view, marred by what 
is at best some very dubious economics .... [T]he evidence concerning intent to exclude 
others is difficult to distinguish from ordinary, intelligent competitive action."); id. at 1275 
("[I)t would appear extremely difficult to distinguish between a progressive embracing 'of 
each new opportunity' and what would ordinarily be considered desirable competitive 
performance."). 
161 See, e.g., KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 107 (criticizing Alcoa's general 
rule). 
162 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text {describing facts of prior case). 
163 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 329 (D. Mass. 
1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam) ("United has continuously sought to antici-
pate all demands of the shoe industry for improved or new machinery, and, where such 
demand seems to invite competition, to forestall such competition by manufacturing and 
distributing such machinery."). 
164 See id. at 329-31 (recounting government's allegations). 
165 /d. at 314 {chiding government for "unforgivably unselective tactics"). 
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Harvard's Public Policy School, in search of a special law clerk to 
assist in the court's analysis of the parties' contentions.166 Mason sug-
gested that Judge Wyzanski appoint Carl Kaysen, then a graduate stu-
dent in the Harvard Economics Department and a participant in 
Mason's working group.167 Judge Wyzanski obliged and hired Kaysen, 
whom he tasked with analyzing the voluminous record that had been 
amassed in the case.168 Kaysen prepared a lengthy report, which he 
subsequently published, with few changes, as his doctoral thesis.169 
While he did not discuss the case in the working group, he reported 
that the general principles animating the group influenced his 
recommendations.17o 
Relying heavily on Kaysen's report, Judge Wyzanski first found 
that United Shoe possessed a monopoly share (75%) of the shoe 
machinery market.171 He then found that various barriers to entry 
made it unlikely that rivals would undermine that share anytime soon. 
These barriers included the excellent quality of United's machines, its 
reputation, and the high quality of its aftermarket service.l72 The bar-
riers also included United's policy of leasing its machines and refusing 
to sell them outright, as well as the adoption of so-called "full capacity 
clause[s]."173 These clauses required lessees to use machines they had 
leased from United at full capacity before turning to machines manu-
factured by rivals. Finally, Judge Wyzanski invoked United's policy of 
requiring lessees to use its repair service as a condition of the lease, a 
service United would not provide to other shoe machinery manufac-
turers.174 This policy, he said, deprived the marketplace of "large scale 
independent repair companies," thereby creating a "stumbling block" 
166 See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanksi, 100 HARV. L. REv. 713, 713 
(1987) (recounting events that led to Kaysen's appointment as special law clerk). 
167 See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES v. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CoRPORATION. 
AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CAsE viii (1956) (describing Kaysen's partici-
pation in Mason's working group). 
168 Kaysen, supra note 166, at 713-14. 
169 KAYSEN, supra note 167, at vii. 
170 /d. at viii. 
171 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953), 
affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
172 Id. at 344 ("To combat United's market control, a competitor must be prepared with 
knowledge of shoemaking, engineering skill, capacity to invent around patents, and finan-
cial resources sufficient to bear the expense of long developmental and experimental 
processes."); see also supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (explaining that production 
of high-quality products at low prices will exclude less efficient rivals). 
173 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 320, 324-25 (describing such clauses and their entry-
deterring effects). 
174 See id. at 344 ("The three principal sources of United's power have been the original 
constitution of the company, the superiority of United's products and services, and the 
leasing system. The first two of these are plainly beyond reproach." (emphasis added)). 
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for those firms that wished to compete with United, because they 
could not participate in the market without entering at two levelsP5 
Under a purchaser welfare approach, Judge Wyzanski would then 
have asked whether United Shoe's various tactics, alone or in tandem, 
reduced the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market. If a tactic 
excluded rivals but produced no benefits, the answer would be simple: 
The court would ban the arrangement. If, on the other hand, a tactic 
both excluded rivals and produced benefits, the court would ask 
whether those benefits counteracted the impact of any market power 
effects on purchasers and thus enhanced, or at least did not reduce, 
the welfare of purchasers. 
Judge Wyzanski did nothing of the sort. Instead, after a careful 
analysis of existing precedent, he announced and applied a standard 
identical to that suggested by Kaysen's report.176 In particular, Judge 
Wyzanski announced a safe harbor for what he called "competition 
based on pure merit."177 Such conduct included "the use of accessible 
resources, the process of invention and innovation, and the employ-
ment of those techniques of employment, financing, production, and 
distribution, which a competitive society must foster."178 Judge 
Wyzanski went on to include activities such as: "efficient design and 
improvement of machines," "prompt and knowledgeable service," 
"research," refusal to share the fruits of that research, and "economies 
of scale. "179 Each of these was an example of unilateral conduct and 
thus could not implicate section 1 of the Sherman Act, which only 
reaches concerted action.180 As for liability under section 2, Judge 
Wyzanski recognized that the tactics that he accepted as "competition 
on pure merit" could make entry by competitors difficult and thus 
could create or fortify a monopoly; indeed, he found that they had 
done so in the case at hand.l81 Nonetheless, he said, these practices 
were "beyond reproach" and constituted the "superior skill, foresight, 
and industry" that were "the inevitable consequences of ability, nat-
175 /d. at 325. 
176 See Meese, supra note 153, at 801 nn.247-48 (collecting various authorities demon-
strating influence of Kaysen's report on Judge Wyzanski's opinion). 
177 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 345. 
178 /d. at 344-45. 
179 /d.; see id. at 333 (finding that United had "never offered to license all, or its prin-
cipal, shoe machinery patents"). 
180 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759, 763, 767-78 
(1984) (holding unilateral conduct to be beyond reach of section 1). 
181 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 ("United's control does not rest solely on its 
original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of scale." (emphasis added)); 
see also HovENKAMP, supra note 88, at 553 ("Nothing is a more effective barrier to entry 
than a firm's capacity to produce a high quality product at a low price, or to provide 
improved service to its customers."). 
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ural forces, or law."182 In short, the court declined to condemn con-
duct that helped create and fortify a monopoly without making any 
effort to ascertain the net impact of such conduct on purchasers. 
United Shoe, of course, had done more than just engage in the 
sort of unilateral competition on the merits that Judge Wyzanski 
declined to condemn. It had also entered various contracts with cus-
tomers that, as Judge Wyzanski found, made entry by rivals more diffi-
cult.l83 Moreover, extant economic theory had no benign explanation 
for such practices; economists interpreted them as the use of 
monopoly power to foreclose rivals from competitive opportunities.184 
As such, these agreements were incompatible with workable competi-
tion and thus the very antithesis of competition on the merits as Judge 
Wyzanski defined it.185 Even though such conduct might be "honestly 
industrial," in the sense that non-monopolists might employ such tac-
tics, Judge Wyzanski nonetheless declared it to be unlawful because it 
excluded rivals without creating any offsetting benefits.186 
Judge Wyzanski, it should be noted, did not expressly depart from 
Alcoa, but instead purported to follow that decision, which was, after 
all, binding on him.187 He read the decision as banning the achieve-
ment or maintenance of monopoly by "manoeuvres" that, while "hon-
estly industrial," were "not economically inevitable, but were rather 
the result of the firm's free choice of business policies."188 At the same 
time, he claimed to find within Alcoa a safe harbor for firms that had 
achieved a monopoly solely as the result of "superior skill, superior 
products, natural advantages, (including accessibility to raw materials 
or markets), economic or technological efficiency, (including scientific 
research), low margins of profit maintained permanently and without 
discrimination, or licenses conferred by, and used within, the limits of 
law, (including patents on one's own inventions, or franchises granted 
182 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)); see also KAYSEN, supra note 167, at 16-19 (arguing 
that monopoly maintained by means of economies of scale is unobjectionable). 
183 See United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344 ("But United's control does not rest solely on 
its original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies of scale. There are other 
barriers to competition, and these barriers were erected by United's own business 
policies."). 
184 See Meese, supra note 153, at 771-93 (explaining how economic theory of period 
treated various nonstandard agreements as coercive efforts to protect or extend monopoly 
power); see a/so BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 159, 330-31 (concluding 
that nonstandard contracts such as tying and exclusive dealing agreements are coercive 
efforts by manufacturers to maintain or extend their power). 
185 See Meese, supra note 153, at 793-812 (describing workable competition paradigm's 
influence on section 2 doctrine). 
186 United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 341-43. 
187 See id. at 341-43 (invoking and purporting to follow Alcoa). 
188 /d. at 341. 
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directly to the enterprise by a public authority)."189 He did not cite 
any particular portion of Alcoa to support this claim or explain the 
difference between expanding output-the conscious business policy 
that doomed Alcoa-and enforcing a patent or realizing economies of 
scale-both of which he claimed to be perfectly lawful under the 
Alcoa formulation. In so doing, Judge Wyzanski took a page from a 
then-recent Supreme Court decision, which had endorsed Alcoa while 
at the same time claiming that the decision rested on a finding that 
Alcoa had engaged in "unlawful" tactics.190 Despite this creative 
effort at reconciliation, Judge Wyzanski had plainly departed from 
Hand's rationale_191 
C. Harvard Touts United Shoe (and Total Welfare) 
Antitrust scholars from the Harvard School, who had criticized 
Alcoa, endorsed Judge Wyzanski's opinion and approach in United 
Shoe, including the result that monopoly obtained or maintained by 
"competitive merit" was beyond reproach.192 Indeed, one might say 
that the decision was a paradigmatic exemplar of the Harvard School 
approach to antitrust regulation generally. Just five years after the 
decision, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, the former an MIT econo-
mist and the latter an economist at Harvard Law School, published 
their definitive text Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Anal-
ysis .193 A preface to the book by Edward Mason described the tome 
as the fruit of the Harvard-centered study group that he had formed 
less than a decade earlier.194 The first and third chapters outlined the 
189 /d. at 342. 
190 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 786 (1946) (characterizing 
Alcoa as resting upon finding that "there was a use of various unlawful means to establish 
or maintain the monopoly"). In fact, Judge Hand found no such independently "unlawful 
means" but instead held that the otherwise lawful and normal conduct nonetheless violated 
section 2. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). 
191 See LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN, HANDBOOK oF THE LAw oF ANTITRUST 95-99 (1977) 
(concluding that holding of United Shoe revised Alcoa and correctly stated law of monopo-
lization); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-4 
(1980) (pointing out that United Shoe opinion departed from Alcoa in manner favorable to 
monopolists). 
192 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 22, 44, 268 (approving approach in United 
Shoe and stating that "the Sherman Act has been interpreted-and properly, we think-to 
leave room for legal monopolies, that is, for monopolies acquired solely by competitive 
merit" (emphasis added)). 
193 KA YSEN & TURNER, supra note 157. 
194 See Mason, supra note 157, at xix ("[T]he study is, in an important sense, the product 
of the discussion of a group of lawyers and economists extending over several years. The 
authors would be the first to admit that the contribution of the group to the formulation of 
the ideas here presented has been large."). 
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overarching framework the authors would employ to evaluate various 
business practices and the appropriate antitrust policy toward each.195 
According to the authors, antitrust law should interdict what they 
called an "unreasonable degree of market power."196 Under a pur-
chaser welfare balancing test, antitrust law might determine "reasona-
bleness" by asking whether the restraint or other challenged practice 
resulted in higher prices than would obtain without the practice.197 
However, Kaysen and Turner did not mention the welfare of pur-
chasers; they instead chose a different approach to determining rea-
sonableness, one derived from neoclassical price theory's workable 
competition model, which had informed Mason's own work for two 
decades.l98 That is, following earlier work by Mason, the authors 
admonished courts and the enforcement agencies to treat as "reason-
able" any market power that was necessary to "maintain[] desirable 
levels of economic performance. "199 Desirable performance, in turn, 
was defined as an efficient allocation of productive resources.200 Thus, 
the authors proposed a standard whereby the law would interdict sig-
nificant amounts of market power unless possession of such power 
was necessary to realize nontrivial efficiencies.201 For instance, these 
195 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 3-23. 
196 /d. at 44-45 (describing primary goal of antitrust policy as eliminating "undue 
market power to the extent consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic per-
formance"); see also id. at 77-79 (describing elimination of "unreasonable market power" 
as authors' primary goal). 
197 See, e.g., Salop, supra note 3, at 313-14, 330-32. 
198 See Clark, supra note 153 (discussing workable competition model). I do not mean to 
suggest that Professors Kaysen and Turner endorsed each policy prescription that could be 
attributed to some version of workable competition. On the contrary, the authors expressly 
distanced themselves from particular versions of workable competition theory. KA YSEN & 
TuRNER, supra note 157, at 81-82. However, they expressly embraced that version of 
workable competition which "identifies markets as workably competitive when they 
cannot be made more so, consistent with the requirements of efficiency and the recognition 
of the realities of consumer preference and geography." See id. at 81; see also BAIN, INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 159, at 13-18 (describing and endorsing workable com-
petition as guide to public policy). 
199 See KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 44-45 ("[W]e are suggesting that the 
primary goal of antitrust policy be the limitation of undue market power to the extent 
consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic performance."); see also MASON, 
supra note 154, at 387 (articulating similar standard for "permissible power"). 
200 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 11-12. The authors identified four attributes 
of economic performance: efficiency, progressiveness, stability in output and employment, 
and an equitable distribution of income. They concluded, however, that antitrust policy 
was not an appropriate vehicle for stabilizing the economy or assuring an equitable distri-
bution of income. See id. at 11-12. Nineteen years later, Bork would agree without citing 
Kaysen and Turner. See BoRK, ANTITRusT PARADox, supra note 2, at 110-12 (opining 
that courts should not use antitrust to affect distribution of income). 
201 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 78 ("Market power resting on certain 
bases we consider 'reasonable,' because we think it either undesirable or impossible to 
eliminate them .... [Market power resulting from economies of scale] could be reduced 
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scholars concluded that a merger that conferred market power on the 
merging parties (and thus raised prices) should nonetheless survive 
antitrust scrutiny so long as it produced significant efficiencies that 
could not be achieved by other means.202 They also concluded that 
antitrust law should not condemn product differentiation, even though 
such conduct would naturally lead to market power and higher 
prices.203 Moreover, these scholars and others advocated breaking up 
firms that possessed significant market power, unless such action 
would prevent the realization of significant efficiencies.204 Finally, 
these authors argued that courts should not condemn monopolies 
achieved solely as a result of economies of scale and similar competi-
tion on the merits.205 Attacking such market power would result in 
"producing at higher costs in inefficiently small units"-a price the 
authors "d[id] not desire to pay."206 Not surprisingly, then, they and 
other members of the Harvard School endorsed the standard 
announced in United Shoe as an appropriate implementation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.zo7 
This approach was emphatically not a purchaser welfare bal-
ancing test or otherwise an effort to maximize the welfare of pur-
chasers. Indeed, when defining the content of "desirable economic 
results," the authors rejected "an equitable distribution of income" as 
a variable antitrust law could or should influence.208 Thus, like the test 
only at the cost of producing at higher costs in inefficiently small units; this price we do not 
desire to pay."). 
202 /d. at 133-34. This result, of course, followed the more general principle that society 
should tolerate market power that is necessary to realize efficiencies. See, e.g., MASON, 
supra note 154, at 387. 
203 KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 77-78; see also Mason, Monopoly in Law and 
Economics, supra note 152, at 48 (noting that law does not condemn successful differentia-
tion of product even though it may entrench monopoly power); BAIN, supra note 154, at 
. 373-74 (noting that product differentiation in oligopolistic markets may lead to less than 
optimum production). 
204 See, e.g., KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 113; MILLER, supra note 153, at 
411-12 {advocating breaking up firms "to [the] extent ... feasible without interfering with 
the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of operation"); MAsON, supra note 
154, at 387 {"There is no reason, however, to tolerate positions of market power that can 
be lessened by appropriate antitrust action unless it can be shown that this lessening sub-
stantially interferes with the job to be done [by the firm]." (emphasis added)). 
205 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 157, at 78. 
206 /d. 
207 See, e.g., id. at 268 (suggesting .. justifications" for market power that "closely 
resemble those suggested by Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe"); MASON, supra note 154, at 
387-88 (arguing that courts should tolerate market power where concentration resulting in 
such power is dictated by economies of scale); JoEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR 
CoMPETITION: THE LAw AND EcoNOMICS oF ANTITRuST PouCY 62-63 (1954) (same); 
MILLER, supra note 153, at 411 (same). 
208 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 157, at 11-12. 
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articulated by Judge Wyzanski, the standard endorsed by these 
scholars did not incorporate any examination of the actual or pre-
dicted impact of a monopolist's conduct upon purchasers in the rele-
vant market.209 Instead, (perhaps) unlike formative-era judges, the 
Harvard School plainly contemplated that, in some cases, firms would 
achieve or maintain market power or even a monopoly by realizing 
economies of scale or other efficiencies. They did not assert that 
monopolists would pass such savings on to purchasers in the relevant 
market, but instead endorsed such conduct because it would enhance 
society's overall welfare by ensuring the best possible arrangement of 
productive resources.210 They even anticipated a "second best" objec-
tion to their approach, arguing that antitrust policy should adopt a 
"Pigovian assumption" that "it is desirable to make as close an 
approach to the conditions of economic efficiency in as many sectors 
of economy as possible."211 The authors' invocation of Pigou only 
made sense within a total welfare framework.212 Kaysen and Turner 
thus implicitly applied the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion so often 
209 See id. at 11-12, 44-45 (suggesting that "primary goal of antitrust policy" should be 
"limitation of undue market power to the extent consistent with maintaining desirable 
levels of economic performance"); id. at 77-79 (asserting that antitrust policy should elimi-
nate only unreasonable market power); id. at 45 (arguing that antitrust policy should tol-
erate market power that is necessary to achieve "efficiency and progressiveness"). 
210 See id. at 12 ("Efficiency is ideally a distributive or relational concept, which 
embraces the whole economy. Essentially [efficiency] is a state in which no rearrangement 
of outputs among products and no redistribution of inputs among firms could increase 
consumer satisfaction."). The term "consumer satisfaction," read in light of the authors' 
reference to efficiency in "the whole economy" plainly refers to what Robert Bork called 
"consumer want satisfaction," that is, the aggregate welfare of all consumers, whether or 
not they purchased the monopolist's product. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying 
text; see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION supra note 159, at 24 (stating that general 
equilibrium theory, "is our primary source of standards as to what constitutes desirable 
performance by firms and industries"); MILLER, supra note 153, at 360 (employing similar 
definition of efficiency relevant to competition policy). 
211 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 157, at 12 & n.11. Pigou pioneered the theory of 
regulating externalities to prevent market failure, thereby maximizing the "national divi-
dend," or total welfare. See A.C. PIGou, THE EcoNOMICS OF WELFARE 31-42 (1932) 
(equating "national dividend" with "economic welfare"); id. at 127-30 (describing plan of 
book as determining extent to which "free play of self interest" will maximize "national 
dividend"); id. at 172-203 (examining role of externalities in creating market failure and 
possible remedies). 
212 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A 
Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 69-71 (1968) (arguing that antitrust regulation can be 
explained as effort to replicate allocation of resources that would occur in absence of bar-
gaining costs, thereby maximizing total welfare). 
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employed by economists as a guide to public policy.213 Turner would 
use the same normative benchmark in subsequent work.214 
The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Wyzanski's decision unani-
mously.215 Moreover, the distinction between competition on the 
merits and unnatural exclusion has served as the backbone for much 
section 2 doctrine ever since. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., for 
instance, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by Judge Wyzanski 
that condemned the Grinnell Corporation for maintenance of its 
monopoly.216 In so doing, the Court announced that section 2 did not 
forbid a monopoly obtained or maintained by means of "superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident."217 Instead, the 
Court-without mentioning purchaser welfare or any synonym 
thereof-condemned the firm because it had achieved and maintained 
its monopoly position by means of mergers with rivals and long-term 
leases that the Court characterized as "coercive."218 
Proponents of a purchaser welfare approach to section 2 regularly 
assert that support for the total welfare standard originated with the 
Chicago School and is still confined to that subset of antitrust scholars 
and jurists.219 By framing support for the total welfare standard in this 
way, proponents of purchaser welfare minimize the apparent support 
for the total welfare standard while at the same time offering their 
own approach as the mainstream view long-embraced by the Supreme 
Court. This Part has offered an entirely different account of the ori-
gins of the total welfare school, an approach that undermines the story 
told by proponents of the purchaser welfare standard. As it turns out, 
before there was a recognized Chicago School of antitrust analysis, the 
so-called Harvard School was generating doctrinal prescriptions pre-
mised upon a normative total welfare account of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. These prescriptions influenced the seminal United Shoe 
decision and, ironically, presaged the Chicago School's own commit-
ment to a total welfare standard. Support for the total welfare stan-
dard is more widespread and deeply rooted than generally supposed. 
213 See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS oF LAw 12-15 (1986) (defining 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion and discussing relationship between Kaldor-Hicks and 
Pareto superiority criteria). 
21 4 See Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Poli-
cies, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1208-09 (1969) (assuming that appropriate goal of economic 
policy is to "maximize aggregate economic wealth" and endorsing view that economies of 
scale should justify high concentration). 
215 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
216 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
217 /d. at 571. 
218 /d. at 578. 
219 See supra note 149 (collecting authorities attributing this view primarily to Bork). 
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By 1965, the Chicago and Harvard Schools had embraced the 
total welfare normative framework to govern section 2's regulation of 
monopolists' conduct. For instance, both schools agreed that a so-
called efficient monopolist did not offend section 2, without regard to 
whether the monopoly reduced the welfare of purchasers in the rele-
vant market. Moreover, United Shoe and its progeny embraced this 
approach, which it implemented in light of the economic theory of the 
time. Accordingly, competition on the merits was lawful per se, while 
agreements that tended to exclude rivals were deemed coercive exer-
cises of monopoly power without offsetting benefits and thus, if 
entered into by a monopolist, were unlawful per se. 
This apparent agreement on normative premises may seem sur-
prising to some. After all, scholars have often portrayed Harvard and 
Chicago as competing schools of thought offering radically different 
prescriptions for antitrust doctrine.220 Indeed, there is no doubt that 
the two schools have often advocated vastly different legal rules gov-
erning various types of conduct.221 Nonetheless, the evidence adduced 
thus far suggests that these differences do not reflect any normative 
disagreement about what effects matter for antitrust purposes, at least 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. On the contrary, as suggested 
elsewhere, these differences would seem to be purely descriptive; they 
result from different economic appraisals of the impact of the prac-
tices in question.222 In any event, as explained below, Harvard con-
tinued to embrace the total welfare account of section 2 doctrine-so 
often associated with the Chicago School-well into the 1980s and 
1990s. 
A. Harvard Reiterates Its Support for Total Welfare 
This collective embrace of the total welfare standard was no 
passing fad or anomaly. During the 1970s, the Harvard School reiter-
ated and systematized the approach to section 2 litigation that Judge 
Wyzanski articulated in the United Shoe decision and that Kaysen and 
Turner endorsed in their 1959 treatise. For instance, in 1975, 
Professors Turner and Areeda published their blockbuster article on 
220 MichaelS. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 
74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 226-28 (1995) (characterizing Harvard and Chicago as competing 
schools of antitrust thought); Posner, supra note 145, at 925-33 (arguing that "there was a 
time" when Harvard and Chicago were distinct but that those distinctions have "greatly 
diminished"). 
221 See Posner, supra note 145, at 925-33 (describing these differences). 
222 See id. 
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predatory pricing, which embraced the safe harbor for competition on 
the merits.223 Areeda had been a student at Harvard Law School 
while Mason's working group was active, and Kingman Brewster, 
Harvard's antitrust authority at the time, was a member of the 
group.224 The Areeda-Turner article sought to articulate the standards 
courts should employ to examine predatory pricing by monopolists 
and firms allegedly seeking monopoly power. The authors began with 
the assumption that competition on the merits was lawful, even if it 
injured or dispatched rival firms and led to higher purchaser prices.225 
They also concluded that above-cost pricing was always competition 
on the merits and thus lawful per se. 226 The authors recognized that 
such a safe harbor could in some cases reduce the welfare of pur-
chasers, by allowing monopolists to deter or defeat entry by less-
efficient rivals and thus maintain monopoly prices.227 Nonetheless, 
they adhered to their safe harbor proposal, in part because such high 
prices were the natural reward that drove firms to obtain a monopoly 
by innovating and realizing productive efficiencies in the first place: 
Moreover, a monopolist whose power was legitimately acquired by 
patents cannot be denied monopoly profits without subverting the 
purpose of the patent laws. Similarly, denying monopoly profits to 
those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and 
industry could eliminate the primary incentive to develop such com-
petitive skill. Finally, price restrictions would have perverse effects 
on the efficiency and innovation aspects of a monopolist's on-going 
performance by eliminating the reward.22s 
223 See Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 {1975). William Kovacic has 
argued that this article "has a strong claim to be the most influential law review article ever 
written on an antitrust topic." Kovacic, supra note 149, at 46. I do not disagree with this 
assessment. At the same time, it should be noted that the safe harbor for above-cost 
pricing and competition on the merits endorsed by this 1975 article can trace its origins to 
Judge Wyzanski's United Shoe decision more than two decades earlier and the Harvard 
School that influenced him. 
224 Mason, supra note 157, at xix. 
225 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 697 ("A firm which drives out or excludes 
rivals by selling at unremunerative prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in 
behavior that may properly be called predatory."). 
226 /d. at 706 ("Exclusion by charging prices equal to average cost is also competition on 
the merits-only those potential entrants who cannot survive at the efficiency-related price 
are kept out .... [M]ore-or-less permanently 'low' prices are ... not an abuse of power or 
exclusionary behavior for the purposes of Section two .... " (footnotes omitted)); id. at 709 
("[W]e conclude that a price at or above average cost should be demed [sic] non-preda-
tory, and not in law exclusionary, whether permanent or not."). 
227 See id. at 705-06 (recognizing that so-called above-cost "limit pric[ing)" by incum-
bent monopolist can deter entry and thereby help incumbent sustain monopoly prices). 
228 /d. at 707. 
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Here again, the authors concluded that the welfare of purchasers in a 
particular market should yield to the overall welfare of society. As 
one scholar has explained, this approach to predatory pricing was 
indistinguishable from that taken by the Chicago School.229 
Three years later, Turner and Areeda would publish the early 
volumes of their extremely influential treatise on antitrust law. There 
they repeated their assertion that section 2 should not reach competi-
tion on the merits, and they offered the most comprehensive defini-
tion to date of that term, a definition consistent with that offered by 
Carl Kaysen and Judge Wyzanski more than two decades earlier.230 
After opining that section 2 should forbid "exclusionary" conduct by a 
monopolist, they went on to try and define it: 
[T]he first step in defining "exclusionary" conduct is to state what it 
clearly is not. Our concern about monopoly and the opportunities of 
rivals must not be allowed to obscure the objective of antitrust law 
which seeks to protect the process of competition on the merits and 
the economic results associated with workable competition. Accord-
ingly, non-exploitative pricing, higher output, improved product 
quality, energetic market penetration, successful research and 
development, cost-reducing innovations, and the like are welcomed 
by the Sherman Act and are not therefore to be considered "exclu-
sionary" for § 2 purposes even if monopoly results. We attempt no 
further catalogue of desirable behavior at this point, but rest for the 
moment on the desirability of behavior constituting competition on 
the merits-the superior skill, foresight, and industry of which Judge 
Hand spoke. Antitrust law should not base the imposition of sanc-
tions on the very conduct it would encourage. Behavior that is no 
more restrictive of rivals' opportunities than is reasonably necessary 
to effect competition on the merits is and should be approved by 
Sherman Act § 2. Such behavior is, after all, indispensable if the 
antitrust laws are to achieve their objective. Thus, "exclusionary" 
comprehends at the most the behavior that not only (1) tends to 
impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not fur-
ther competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way.23l 
229 See Kovacic, supra note 149, at 43-71 (showing that Harvard approach to predatory 
pricing law, private actions, and refusals to deal mirrored that advocated by Chicago 
School and vice versa). It should be noted that, despite its title, Professor Kovacic's article 
deals only with unilateral conduct by monopolists and not all dominant firm conduct. 
Moreover, the article does not examine section 2's normative premise, the underlying nor-
mative agreement between Harvard and Chicago, the Harvard School origin of the total 
welfare standard, nor the United Shoe decision or the origins of the term "competition on 
the merits." 
230 See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. 
231 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 124, 'll 626b (emphasis added). Despite this pas-
sage's reference to "non-exploitative pricing," the authors subsequently took the position 
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Areeda and Turner also expressly endorsed the rationale and 
result of the United Shoe decision.232 The authors endorsed the eco-
nomic results associated with workable competition and recognized 
that competition on the merits could lead to and help maintain a 
monopoly, to the detriment of purchasers, but nonetheless adhered to 
such a safe harbor because of the welfare consequences over the long 
term. To this end, they expressly opined that "exploitative" monopo-
listic pricing should not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.233 Other 
Harvard School scholars reached the same result.234 
Moreover, buried in this paragraph and subsequent pages is a 
subtle expansion of the sort of conduct the Harvard School thought 
beyond the reach of section 2. Recall that United Shoe had drawn a 
distinction between "competition based on pure merit," on the one 
hand, and so-called "conscious business policies," on the other.235 
Agreements made by monopolists that disadvantaged rivals were, of 
course, "conscious policies" and thus unlawful under this standard.236 
Areeda and Turner employed a different taxonomy, however, distin-
guishing between conduct deemed "exclusionary" from that which 
was lawful. There is no reference to "conscious business policies." 
Moreover, while the authors treated competition on the merits as 
lawful per se, this does not exhaust the category of conduct that the 
authors treat as "non-exclusionary" and thus lawful. This category 
included not only (unilateral) competition on the merits, but also con-
duct that "is reasonably necessary to effect competition on the merits," 
or to "further" competition on the merits, even if such conduct 
impaired the opportunities of rivals.237 Conduct necessary to "effect" 
competition on the merits could include exclusive dealing agreements 
and other nonstandard contracts-what Judge Wyzanski would have 
called unlawful "conscious business policies"-so long as the conduct 
that even "exploitative" monopolistic pricing should not violate section 2 of the Sherman 
Act. /d. 'li 710. 
232 Id. 'JI 626b n.14. 
233 /d. 'li 710. 
234 See SuLLIVAN, supra note 191, at 95-99 (concluding that United Shoe revised Alcoa 
and correctly stated law of monopolization). Sullivan graduated from Harvard Law School 
in 1951, one year after Mason founded his working group and the same year that Phillip 
Areeda entered Harvard. Sullivan's monograph lists several Harvard School industrial 
organization texts as suggested reading. /d. at 15-17. 
235 See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Wyzanski's rea-
soning in United Shoe). 
236 See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (noting that agreements with cus-
tomers, for example, that erect barriers to entry without benign explanation fail "competi-
tion on the merits" standard). 
237 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 124, 'li 626b (emphasis added). 
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produced benefits and was no broader than necessary to achieve those 
benefits.238 
Despite their praise of United Shoe, Professors Areeda and 
Turner endorsed a somewhat less intrusive scope for section 2 than 
Judge Wyzanski had announced. This change did not reflect an adjust-
ment of the normative standard that governed section 2 analysis, but 
instead accommodated changes in positive economic theory that 
undermined the Harvard School's previous hostility toward nonstan-
dard contracts.239 Whereas the old Harvard School believed that such 
contracts could never produce benefits, recent developments in eco-
nomic theory-particularly those hailing from the Chicago School-
had caused Harvard to reconsider its previous position. The most 
famous examples, of course, were the arguments by Lester Telser and 
Robert Bork that minimum resale price maintenance (Telser)240 and 
exclusive territories (Bork)241 could overcome the sort of market 
failure that reliance upon an unbridled market could produce. In fact, 
these arguments led Professor Turner, just before publication of the 
1978 treatise, to reverse his earlier position that exclusive territories 
should be unlawful per se.242 Moreover, as early as 1974, Professor 
Areeda had opined that exclusive dealing contracts could produce 
cognizable benefits by, for instance, promoting special selling efforts 
by individual dealers.Z43 Given these developments, Professors 
238 See id. (defining exclusionary conduct as more restrictive than necessary to "effect 
competition on the merits"). 
239 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (documenting early Harvard School's 
desire to protect "ordinary" competitive actions); Meese, supra note 153, at 812-41 
(describing rise of transaction cost economics and its influence on monopolization 
doctrine). 
240 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & 
EcoN. 86 (1960) (discussing resale price maintenance agreements and benefits of such non-
standard contracts). 
241 See Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 73, at 430-38 (demonstrating how exclusive 
territories can induce dealers to make optimal investments in promotion by preventing free 
riding). 
242 Compare Brief for Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 34-38, Cont'l 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15), 1977 WL 189274 (arguing 
that courts should analyze nonprice vertical restraints under rule of reason), with Donald 
F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 699 (1962) (arguing that vertically-adopted exclu-
sive territories should be unlawful per se ). 
243 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES <j[ 561 (2d ed. 
1974). Scholars have subsequently questioned this assertion, while at the same time identi-
fying other benefits of exclusive dealing contracts. See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive 
Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 6 (1982) (arguing that exclusive dealing contracts create con-
tractual property rights that ensure that manufacturers capture benefits of promotional 
expenditures). Moreover, even before Professor Areeda's casebook, other scholars had 
identified cognizable benefits that such agreements might produce. See Bork, Rule of 
Reason II, supra note 73, at 398-402 (explaining how railroad could induce necessary 
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Areeda and Turner naturally recognized the possibility that conduct 
once deemed unlawful per se-exclusive dealing by monopolists, for 
instance-should now be analyzed under a more forgiving stan-
dard.244 There were parallel developments in the courts and the 
enforcement agencies.245 
B. The Supreme Court Follows Harvard (and Chicago!) 
The Harvard School's pronouncements did not fall on deaf ears. 
Indeed, as some have noted, the Harvard School has exercised partic-
ular influence over the Supreme Court's antitrust doctrine, as evi~ 
denced by the Court's numerous favorable citations of Professor 
Areeda's work.246 As Justice Breyer once put it, Supreme Court advo-
cates would rather cite two paragraphs of Professor Areeda's treatise 
than the holdings of four courts of appeals and the opinions of three 
Supreme Court justices.247 
Section 2 doctrine is no exception. Just over a decade after 
Professors Turner and Areeda published the early volumes of their 
treatise, the Supreme Court took up Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Co. 248 There the Court reviewed a jury's conclusion 
that an admitted monopolist had employed unlawful tactics-notably 
a refusal to continue in a joint venture-to maintain its monopoly 
position. The Court examined the lower court's jury instructions that 
distinguished between a monopoly that was "legitimately gained" and 
that obtained or maintained by means of exclusionary conduct.249 This 
distinction was consistent with that endorsed by the Areeda-Turner 
investments by granting sleeping car company exclusive right to serve its line); Milton 
Handler, Statement Before the Small Business Administration, 11 ANn:TRUST BuLL. 417, 
424-25 (1966) (contending that exclusive dealing arrangement can avoid putting seller at 
buyer's mercy and thereby help induce relationship-specific investment by seller). 
244 See Meese, supra note 153, at 832-41 (explaining how developments in economic 
theory led courts to adjust standards governing nonstandard contracts by monopolists). 
245 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51, 57-59 (1977) 
(rejecting application of per se ban on non price vertical restraints given propensity of such 
restraints to overcome free riding and thus encourage optimal promotion expenditures); 
Koppers Co., 77 F.T.C. 1675, 1684 (1970) (holding that requirements contracts "are partic-
ularly suspect when used by a monopolist" and that such agreements were unlawful absent 
"very strong justification"); see also infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text (discussing 
lower courts' application of relaxed standard to various forms of conduct). 
246 ALexis search reveals at least fifty citations of Professor Areeda's work in the U.S. 
Reports (last searched Apr. 1, 2010). See also Kovacic, supra note 149, at 43-71 (docu-
menting influence of Harvard School on various antitrust doctrines generated by Supreme 
Court). 
247 Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REv. 889, 890 
(1996). 
248 472 u.s. 585 (1985). 
249 /d. at 596. 
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treatise.250 The instructions, which the Court quoted with approval, 
elaborated on this distinction, noting that it was "legitimate" (and thus 
lawful per se) for a monopolist to "tak[ e] advantage of scale econo-
mies by constructing a large and efficient factory."251 The instructions 
contained no caveat for instances in which the resulting market power 
due to this construction injured purchasers in a relevant market. More 
generally, the instructions stated that a monopoly gained or main-
tained by means of a "superior product, well-run business, or luck" 
was beyond reproach, again without any caveat for practices that 
injured purchasers in the relevant market.252 
In approving these instructions, the Court noted that the "central 
message" of the Sherman Act was that firms could obtain new cus-
tomers lawfully through "internal expansion" and "competing success-
fully."253 The Court cited with approval the passage authored by 
Professors Areeda and Turner which narrowed the definition of 
unlawful exclusionary conduct and approved of conduct necessary to 
"effect" or "further" competition on the merits. In doing so, the Court 
also adopted the Areeda-Turner standard for "exclusionary" conduct, 
repeating that it "comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) 
tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not 
further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily 
restrictive way."254 
In the same paragraph, the Court quoted with approval Judge 
Bork's definition of exclusionary conduct as conduct that excludes 
rivalry on some basis other than efficiency, apparently treating that 
definition as co-extensive with that offered by Professors Areeda and 
Turner.255 By contrast, a proponent of the purchaser welfare standard 
has expressly rejected Bork's test as inconsistent with a purchaser wel-
fare approach to section 2, further indicating that the Court implicitly 
accepted a total welfare approach.256 
Aspen Skiing establishes the following two-part test for evalu-
ating claims of exclusion. First, so-called competition on the merits, 
250 See supra note 231 and accompanying text (providing Areeda-Turner definition of 
exclusionary conduct). 
251 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597. 
252 See id. at 596. 
253 /d. at 600 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 
(1975)). 
254 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (quoting AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 124, 
'II 626b) (emphasis added). 
255 See id. at 605. 
256 See Salop, supra note 3, at 328-29 (providing example of exclusionary conduct that 
would offend purchaser welfare standard but would not offend standard articulated by 
Bork). 
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such as realizing economies of scale (by internal expansion) is "legiti-
mate" and thus lawful per se. Second, conduct that is not itself compe-
tition on the merits is nonetheless lawful, even if it disadvantages 
rivals, if it "furthers" competition on the merits and is not overly 
restrictive. Neither portion of this test requires the court to assess the 
impact of the conduct on purchasers in the relevant market or 
somehow balance the benefits of the conduct against its harms, how-
ever the latter are conceived.257 In other words, the Court announced 
that competition on the merits, even when conducted by an adjudi-
cated monopolist, is lawful per se, without regard to the impact of such 
conduct on purchasers in the relevant market.258 Conduct that furthers 
such competition is lawful, unless there is a less restrictive means of 
achieving the same benefits. This less restrictive alternative test fol-
lows naturally from a total welfare standard, in that it minimizes the 
misallocation of resources and, consequently, reduces externalities 
produced by the restraint.259 
The Court went on to affirm the jury's verdict that the defendant 
had maintained its monopoly through conduct that did not constitute 
or further competition on the merits.260 In so doing, the Court empha-
sized the defendant's inability to articulate any beneficial rationale for 
its conduct.261 Conversely, if the defendant had been able to articulate 
257 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596-97 (citing with approval trial court's instructions 
that monopoly power derived from superior business ability or efficiency does not violate 
section 2). 
258 While the Court examined the impact of defendant's conduct on purchasers, it 
plainly assumed that a negative impact was a necessary condition for liability but not a 
sufficient one; immediately after stating that it was "relevant" to consider the impact of the 
defendant's conduct on purchasers, the Court quoted with approval the Areeda-Turner 
formulation as well as Judge Bork's definition of exclusionary conduct. !d. at 605 & nn. 
32-33. 
259 Meese, supra note 63, at 112 (explaining how proper application of less restrictive 
alternative test can be characterized as externality regulation). 
260 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605-11 (outlining Court's characterization of defen-
dant's actions). 
261 See id. at 608-11 ("Thus, the evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not 
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and 
consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long run impact on smaller rivals."). 
Professor Robert Pitofsky claims that Aspen Skiing "require[s] a balancing approach 
that compares the adverse impact of the refusal to deal on the competitive process with any 
efficiency effects that may simultaneously arise, taking into account the possibility of less 
restrictive alternatives that might produce comparable efficiencies." Pitofsky, Testimony, 
supra note 3, at 5; see also Pitofsky, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 3, at 217 & n.24 (to 
same effect); Gavil, supra note 8, at 21-23 (claiming that law is ambiguous on this ques-
tion); Varney, supra note 5, at 11-14 (reading Aspen Skiing and Microsoft as establishing 
requirement that courts "weigh" procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and determine 
whether "on balance the net effect of [a monopolist's] conduct harms competition and 
consumers"). I respectfully disagree with Professor Pitofsky's characterization of Aspen 
Skiing, which in my view finds no support in the language or rationale of the decision. The 
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(and prove) such a benefit, the defendant's conduct would have sur-
vived unscathed, so long as it was not broader than necessary to 
achieve the benefit in question. 
Six years later, the Court reiterated this approach in a case 
involving a challenge to a monopolist's tying agreements and refusals 
to deal. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, the Court 
held that section 2 forbids only the "willful acquisition or maintenance 
of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as 
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident. "262 Thus, the Court continued, mere possession of a 
monopoly does not offend section 2, unless the defendant uses that 
power to foreclose rivals' opportunities.263 Applying this test to the 
facts before it, the Court held that a plaintiff could establish a prima 
facie case of unlawful monopolization by showing that the monopo-
list's conduct excluded its rivals from a significant portion of the mar-
ketplace and thereby strengthened its monopoly position.264 The 
Court also held that, if the plaintiffs should succeed in making out 
their prima facie case, the defendant could nonetheless prevail by 
establishing that the challenged conduct was supported by "valid busi-
ness reasons."265 The only caveat was that the conduct must be no 
word "balance" does not appear in the opinion; nor does any synonym thereof. Moreover, 
neither the language in the opinion nor the jury instructions the Court implicitly approved 
implies that the finder of fact should "balance," "weigh," or "compare" the benefits of a 
restraint or other practice against any harms that the restraint produces. Instead, the Court 
made it absolutely plain that conduct that constitutes "competition on the merits" or fur-
thers such competition cannot violate section 2, absent a less restrictive method of fur-
thering said competition. 
To be sure, application of a less restrictive alternative test depends on the assumption 
that the benefits of a practice coexist with harms. Absent such coexistence, there would be 
no rationale for encouraging a different method of achieving the same benefits. Meese, 
supra note 153, at 761. Still, Aspen Skiing's invocation of this test does not suggest the 
Court was employing a purchaser welfare standard for two reasons. First, the Court did not 
equate restrictiveness with impact upon prices paid by purchasers in the relevant market. 
Second, under the Court's approach, proof that a practice is the least restrictive means of 
producing particular benefits would shield the defendant from liability, without regard to 
whether the benefits in question outweighed the harms or whether the restraint resulted in 
higher or lower prices. Thus, while the less restrictive alternative test requires monopolists 
to produce as much possible, it does not require them immediately to share those benefits 
with purchasers. 
262 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (quoting 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
263 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 
107 (1948)). 
264 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (stating that, absent valid business reasons, 
adopting exclusionary policy to maintain or strengthen monopoly violates section 2). 
265 See id. at 483 ("[R]espondents have presented evidence that Kodak took exclu-
sionary action to maintain its parts monopoly .... "). 
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broader than necessary to achieve the benefits it claimed.266 Applying 
this standard, the Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on the monopolization claims because the 
plaintiff had adduced evidence that the defendant could achieve its 
legitimate purposes via less restrictive means.267 
Here again the Court announced and applied the Areeda-Turner 
definition of unlawful exclusion, a definition that did not contemplate 
balancing or otherwise turn on the impact of the challenged conduct 
on purchasers in the relevant market. Instead, even if the conduct in 
question excluded rivals from the marketplace, the defendant would 
nonetheless prevail if it could show that such exclusion was necessary 
to achieve significant benefits, without regard to whether the practice 
on balance harmed purchasers. 
The Court gave greater content to competition on the merits in 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.268 There, 
the Court reiterated the conclusion of Judge Wyzanski, the Harvard 
School, and others that above-cost pricing was lawful per se, expressly 
relying upon the work of Professors Areeda and Turner to support its 
conclusions.269 It would not matter, the Court said, if such competi-
tion fortified a monopoly or otherwise facilitated the exercise of 
market power.270 Regardless of the ultimate impact on purchaser wel-
fare, proof that the defendant had priced below some measure of cost 
was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a showing of monop-
olization through predatory pricing.271 
The message of these decisions and academic commentary was 
not lost on the lower courts. Even before Aspen Skiing, for instance, 
in the watershed case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
the Second Circuit expressly repudiated the more extreme manifesta-
tions of Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion.272 The court quoted United Shoe 
with approval for the proposition that section 2 does not condemn one 
"who merely by superior skill and intelligence got the whole business 
266 See id. at 483-86 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment after finding 
that plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to suggest that Kodak's business practices 
may have been unnecessary to achieve purported benefits). 
267 See id. (outlining defendant's justifications and plaintiffs responses). 
268 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (holding that section 2 does not forbid aggressive pricing 
that preserves monopolist's dominant position). 
269 See id. at 224 (citing Areeda & Thmer, supra note 223, at 708-09). 
270 See id. (stating that its standard applied "[e)ven if the ultimate effect of the [lawful 
price] cut is to induce or reestablish supracompetitive pricing"). 
271 See id. at 223 (holding that proof of below-cost pricing is necessary to predatory 
pricing case against monopolist). 
272 See 603 F.2d 263, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1979) (overruling Alcoa in part); see also 
Robinson, supra note 191, at 6-12 (discussing Berkey Photo's rejection of Alcoa). 
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because nobody could do it as well."273 Evaluating the plaintiff's claim 
that Kodak had maintained its monopoly by means of unlawful con-
duct, the court carefully distinguished between two different sorts of 
conduct capable of maintaining a monopoly: the use of power to dis-
advantage rivals, on the one hand, and superior skill or industry, such 
as the realization of economies of scale, on the other.274 The former 
category was the basis for liability, while the latter was competition on 
the merits and thus lawful per se. 275 Moreover, the court treated the 
development of a new product, and the refusal to share such innova-
tion with rivals, as competition on the merits.276 
To be clear, the court's test for distinguishing between these two 
categories of conduct did not entail any examination of the impact of 
the defendant's practices on purchasers in the relevant market or any 
effort to balance harms against benefits. Instead, the court simply 
asked whether conduct that disadvantaged rivals was supported by a 
"valid business policy."277 Finally, as if to eliminate any trace of doubt, 
the court explained that simply charging a high price could not itself 
violate section 2 if the monopoly in question was obtained or main-
tained via legitimate conduct.278 Several other lower courts have 
adhered to the same standard.279 
273 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), atfd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam)). As the 
Berkey court noted, Judge Wyzanski was himself quoting the legislative history of the Act; 
see also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 ("[A]s we have already indicated, a monopolist is 
permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits .... " 
(citing United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 344)); Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 29-30 
(invoking this passage of legislative history among other evidence in support of argument 
that Congress did not intend for Sherman Act to ban monopoly obtained by means of 
superior efficiency). 
274 See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-75. 
275 See id. at 274 ("A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred 
from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and effi-
cient factory. These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over 
the market." (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
597 (1985))). 
276 /d. at 282-85. 
277 /d. at 284. 
278 See id at 274 & n.12 ("Nor is a lawful monopolist ordinarily precluded from charging 
as high a price for its product as the market will accept."). The qualification "ordinarily" 
was explained as allowing condemnation of "an illegal 'price squeeze' in another market." 
/d. at 274 n.l2. 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(applying standard to practice of exclusive dealing); see also United States v. AMR Corp., 
335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (lOth Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between behavior that abuses 
monopoly power and that which simply "build[s] a better mousetrap"); Trans Sport, Inc. v. 
Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (Marshall, J.) (collecting 
authorities arguing that business-purpose defense can defeat section 2 claim); Cal. 
Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 (9th Cir. 1979) (monopolist may main-
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Section 2's Harvard-inspired safe harbor for competition on the 
merits (e.g., the realization of economies of scale and the development 
of a superior product) cannot be squared with a purchaser-welfare 
approach to antitrust law.280 As courts and scholars have repeatedly 
recognized, legitimate and lawful competition can, by excluding less 
efficient rivals, result in a monopoly.281 Or, such competition can for-
tify and protect a monopoly achieved by accident. In either case, the 
exclusion of rivals who are less efficient, even if only slightly less effi-
cient, can ultimately result in a monopoly and prices that are higher 
than those that would obtain if section 2 doctrine instead prohibited 
such conduct and preserved a deconcentrated market structure at the 
expense of productive efficiency.282 In either case, the safe harbor for 
competition on the merits may result in prices that are higher-and 
purchaser welfare that is lower-than they were before such (per-
tain its "dominant position in the market it created through 'business acumen' which 
[includes] shrewdness in profitable price competition"); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 
985 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A]n entrepreneur is not protected from competition on the merits-
'the summum bonum of the Sherman Act.'" (quoting Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 
835, 851 (5th Cir. 1975))); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 709 
(7th Cir. 1977) (holding proof of monopolists' "misuse" of its power necessary for section 2 
liability); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (lOth Cir. 1975) (arguing that section 
2 leaves room for companies to protect market share through innovation); Cole v. Hughes 
Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 932-33, 938 (lOth Cir. 1954) (en bane) (distinguishing leases from 
those involved in United Shoe on ground that only latter deterred lessees from using com-
petitors' products and holding that "[o]ne who gains a large portion of a market by manu-
facturing a better product and by furnishing better service to his customers, which 
constitutes legitimate competition, is not denounced by the Sherman Act"); E.l. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 745-48 (1980) (invoking United Shoe's hostility toward 
"contracts, arrangements, and policies" which, instead of encouraging competition on pure 
merit, further dominance of particular firm and finding that defendant's continued expan-
sion and refusal to license technology to competitors did not offend section 2). 
280 Two scholars draw a different conclusion about the normative content of section 2 
doctrine, albeit without mentioning Aspen Skiing, Eastman Kodak, United Shoe, appellate 
decisions like Berkey Photo and Dentsply, "competition on the merits," or the Areeda-
Turner definition of exclusionary conduct quoted in Aspen Skiing and other decisions. See 
Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 31, at 192 ("[T]he fundamental goal of antitrust law is to 
protect consumers."). 
281 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223-24 
(1993) (arguing that there is no congnizable claim against businesses engaging in above-
cost price competition); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (stating that Sherman Act does not 
condemn monopoly gained by "superior skill and intelligence" (quoting United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) 
(per curiam))); supra note 181 and accompanying text (explaining how competition on 
merits can create or fortify monopoly); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1985) (approving jury instruction that distinguished 
between abuse of monopoly power and competitive market behavior). 
282 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 706-07 (explaining that monopolists may 
set low prices to prevent market entry and then allow prices eventually to return to higher, 
monopolistic level); cf Williamson, supra note 30, at 22-23 (demonstrating that modest 
efficiency gains can coincide with price increases). 
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fectly lawful) competition took place.Z83 Indeed, lower courts have 
often dismissed monopolization claims once the defendant adduces 
convincing proof of benefits, without purporting to balance those ben-
efits against harms or otherwise determine the overall impact of the 
conduct on purchaser welfare.284 
This is not to say that current section 2 law reflects a perfectly 
honed total welfare approach to monopolists' conduct. In a world 
where judges and juries are omniscient, courts could read section 2 to 
empower factfinders to make a case-by-case determination of whether 
any particular practice increases or reduces overall welfare. But such 
central planning is beyond the skill and ability of real world judges 
and juries. As then-Judge Breyer reminded us, antitrust rules are nec-
essarily imperfect, given the prohibitive administrative costs of perfec-
tion.285 For instance, competition on the merits, as courts have defined 
it, can in some circumstances theoretically reduce total welfare. Econ-
omies of scale that enable a firm to drive rivals from the market may 
provide the monopolist with only a slight cost advantage, with the 
result that the deadweight loss resulting from such conduct may out-
weigh any efficiency gains.286 Moreover, a test that allows monopolists 
to abuse their power by charging whatever the market will bear will 
encourage firms to engage in rent-seeking and thus to make invest-
ments that only make sense on the assumption that they will acquire 
or maintain monopoly power.287 The safe harbors for such conduct 
under current law presumably reflect a judgment that more finely 
tuned examinations, while nominally designed to maximize total wel-
fare, will in fact destroy more wealth than they create by consuming 
scarce administrative resources and deterring beneficial conduct.288 
283 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 706-07 (arguing that availability of 
monopoly profits increases incentives for monopolies to realize efficiencies). 
284 See, e.g., Trans Sport, Inc., 964 F.2d at 189-90 ("[V]alid business rationales are suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of lawful conduct."). 
285 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) 
("[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws 
cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes conflicting) views .... Rules that 
seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the 
vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends 
they seek to serve."). 
286 Cf Williamson, supra note 30 (modeling tradeoff between efficiencies resulting from 
economies of scale and market power simultaneously produced by merger to monopoly). 
287 See RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRusT LAw 13-14 (2d ed. 2001) ("[A]n opportunity 
to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits will attract real 
resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize and by consumers to avoid being charged 
monopoly prices .... "). 
288 See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 15 (resting argument for relatively permissive anti-
trust rules on assumption that misallocation of resources is only harm from monopoly 
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C. The Demands of Stare Decisis 
Of course, the mere fact that courts repeatedly adopt a total wel-
fare standard-and have never adopted a purchaser welfare stan-
dard-does not itself establish the original meaning of the Sherman 
Act. Courts may have misunderstood the meaning of the statute (and 
thwarted the will of Congress) by declining to ban conduct that, for 
instance, creates wealth but also reduces the welfare of purchasers in 
the relevant market.2s9 Even longstanding constructions of a statute 
can be entirely incorrect. 
Even so, courts do not lightly repudiate a deeply rooted construc-
tion of a statute.29o When courts miscons,true a statute, the remedy can 
usually be found in the legislature and not the courts. Indeed, courts 
often distinguish and justify the weaker claims of stare decisis in the 
constitutional context on the ground that it is significantly easier for a 
legislature to amend a statute in response to judicial construction than 
it is for the body politic to amend the Constitution in response to a 
perceived judicial misconstruction of that fundamental charter.291 If in 
fact the purchaser welfare standard reflects the appropriate construc-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act, despite repeated judicial deci-
sions embracing a total welfare standard, then it would seem that 
proponents of such a standard should take their case to Congress and 
not to the courts or enforcement agencies.292 
Still, when it comes to antitrust, the normal principles of stare 
decisis do not apply with full force. Over the past few decades in par-
ticular, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to overrule its own anti-
trust decisions, particularly those that had articulated per se rules 
pricing and that false positives deter cost-reducing conduct and increase cost of producing 
market's entire output). 
289 See Lande, supra note 3, at 93-96 (marshalling evidence from Sherman Act's legisla-
tive history that Congress was concerned with distribution of welfare gains and not just 
gains themselves). 
290 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (1975) 
(declining to disturb longstanding interpretation by lower courts that Congress had 
declined to overturn). 
291 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 & n.l (1991) (collecting thirty-three 
constitutional decisions that Supreme Court had overruled in previous twenty years and 
noting that stare decisis has stronger claim in statutory context than in constitutional con-
text); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), overruled by Helvering v. Montain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) and 
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938) (arguing that demands of stare decisis 
are less pressing in constitutional context); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of 
statutory interpretation .... "). 
292 Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (contending that any change to Court's longstanding per se rule against certain 
tying contracts should come from Congress, not courts). 
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against particular restraints.293 The Court has justified this relaxed 
stare decisis approach by asserting that the Sherman Act is really a 
"common-law statute," that is, a delegation from Congress to the 
courts to fashion a common law governing trade restraints and other 
business practices.294 Before there was a Sherman Act, courts articu-
lating the common law of trade restraints repeatedly held that 
changed economic circumstances could justify the reformulation of 
case law so as to better implement the policies animating the doc-
trine.295 As the Court put it more than two decades ago, the Congress 
that passed the Sherman Act adopted the common law of trade 
restraints "along with its dynamic potential" as reflected in these early 
common law decisions.296 
Thus the total welfare normative premise may be more vulner-
able than it might first seem, at least if proponents of a different 
approach can convince the Supreme Court that Congress had some-
thing else in mind when it passed the Sherman Act. Surely, the 
common law delegation to antitrust courts is sufficiently capacious to 
empower judges to, for instance, abandon a total welfare premise in 
favor of one focused on the welfare of purchasers in the relevant 
market. 
293 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 
(2007) (overruling nearly century-old ban on minimum resale pricing agreements); State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7-8 (1997) (overruling twenty-nine-year ban on maximum 
resale price maintenance); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 
(1977) (overruling ban on nonprice territorial restraints). 
294 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 ("Stare decisis is not as significant in this case, however, 
because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act."); Khan, 522 U.S. at 20-21 
("[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less 
force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 
'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common 
law tradition."' (quoting Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 
(1978))); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (arguing 
that term "restraint of trade" in Sherman Act "invokes the common law itself, and not 
merely the static content that the common law assigned to the term"). 
295 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396,409 (1889) (noting that definition of 
restraint of trade is "not ... inflexible and has been considerably modified" in light of 
changed economic circumstances); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525-26 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1880) ("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or 
enforceable now than they were at any former period, but that the courts look differently 
at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 
419,421-23 (N.Y. 1887) (endorsing modification of common law of trade restraints in light 
of changed economic circumstances); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139 (Wis. 1851) (ana-
lyzing law in light of changing economic situation). 
296 See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 732 (arguing Sherman Act adopted common law 
approach to antitrust law). 
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Not so fast. The Court's invocation of the common law does not 
necessarily imply carte blanche power over normative approaches.297 
In fact, one can explain the various departures from precedent men-
tioned above without imputing to the Court the power to alter norma-
tive standards at its pleasure. Indeed, in each of the decisions 
referenced above, the Court claimed at least to be applying an 
unchanging normative standard in light of changed understandings of 
the positive economic impact of the practice in question.298 More met-
aphorically, each of these departures from precedent can be explained 
as the "translation" of a previous application of an unchanging norma-
tive premise in light of new information about the economic impact of 
a challenged practice in the real world.299 This conclusion follows nat-
urally from the very nature of the rule of reason, which requires courts 
to employ reason to determine whether a challenged practice violates 
the "public policy which the act embodies."300 There is, by contrast, no 
similar rationale for revising the normative premise that informs 
monopolization doctrine, since changes in economic theory cannot by 
themselves undermine the value judgment inherent in the choice 
between total welfare and purchaser welfare.301 
Indeed, there is good reason to conclude the opposite, namely, 
that the claims of stare decisis in this context are particularly strong, 
given the widespread reliance on this normative premise throughout 
the antitrust community and the resulting intellectual infrastructure. 
For decades, legal scholars, economists, and judges have been engaged 
in a multilevel dialogue about the appropriate standards governing 
conduct by monopolists. The result has been an impressive body of 
case law and overarching principles that serve as reference points and 
accepted paradigms which inform continuing discussion and empirical 
and theoretical refinements of possible solutions to antitrust 
297 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 47-48 ("Sherman and others clearly 
believed that they were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts the elaboration of 
subsidiary rules."). 
298 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-18 (reconsidering precedent banning maximum resale price 
maintenance based on changed understanding of restraints' economic effects); Sylvania, 
433 U.S. at 50-59 (reconsidering ban on nonprice vertical restraints in light of new learning 
about impact of restraints). 
299 See Meese, supra note 63, at 89-92 (discussing rule of reason in context of evolving 
economic theory); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1247-51 
{1993) (describing such an approach to interpretation and application of Sherman Act). 
300 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). 
301 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 2, at 48 (arguing that courts interpreting 
Sherman Act must look to economic theory to determine how to implement congressional 
purpose). 
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problems, both old and new.302 A sudden bolt out of the blue, presum-
ably announced in a single decision, declaring or implying that so 
much antitrust doctrine rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the statute's basic purpose would call into question-and perhaps 
render useless-each major section 2 decision even arguably based 
upon a total welfare standard, including the innumerable decisions 
holding that competition on the merits is lawful per se.3°3 Private par-
ties could no longer rely upon such decisions as accurate accounts of 
their legal obligations, thereby undermining important economic reli-
ance interests.304 Firms hoping for certainty would instead have to 
await the slow and uncertain creation of a new body of (hopefully) 
coherent doctrine.305 Moreover, scholars and practitioners would lack 
accepted paradigms they could apply to analogous problems or from 
which they could derive more general principles.306 New decisions 
premised on a purchaser welfare standard would be incommensurable 
with those premised on a different approach.307 These would be very 
high costs to pay for fidelity to a purchaser welfare standard, particu-
larly in light of congressional acquiescence to a complex body of law 
premised on a desire to maximize total welfare. 
VI 
CouNTERARGUMENTS 
Proponents of a purchaser welfare balancing test have offered 
two basic arguments in support of their position that merit addressing. 
First, some have suggested that the safe harbor for unilateral competi-
tion on the merits is a sort of anomaly, an exception to a more general 
302 Cf. Kovacic, supra note 149, at 72 ("Both the Harvard and Chicago Schools abide by 
the view that antitrust doctrine should reflect the rigorous application of microeconomic 
theory and should respond to insights from empirical work about the implementation of 
antitrust rules and about the impact of specific business practices."). 
303 See supra notes 278-79 (collecting authorities holding that competition on merits is 
lawful per se ). 
304 Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare 
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance 
interests are involved .... "). 
305 Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-54 (1977) (criticizing and 
overruling previous decision that had departed from well-settled case law and thus created 
confusion and disparate treatment of economically similar conduct). 
306 Cf THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRucruRE oF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTIONS 23 (1962) ("In 
science, ... a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial 
decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under 
new Or more Stringent conditions."); WOLFGANG STEGMULLER, THE STRUCI"URE AND 
DYNAMICS OF THEORIES 170-80 (1976) (discussing COncept Of paradigm). 
307 See KuHN, supra note 306, at 103 (explaining how competing scientific frameworks 
are often incommensurable, thereby preventing meaningful dialogue between frameworks' 
respective practitioners). 
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purchaser welfare principle approach that can and does animate the 
rest of section 2 law. Second, some have invoked the D.C. Circuit's 
fairly recent decision in the Microsoft case, which articulated and pur-
ported to apply a rule-of-reason balancing test similar to that applied 
under section 1-where courts focus on purchaser welfare-to a 
monopolist's conduct. This Part finds both arguments wanting. 
A. A Bifurcated Standard? 
Some have recognized that current law's safe harbor for competi-
tion on the merits reflects a social welfare approach to section 2 to the 
exclusion of a purchaser welfare approach.308 Nonetheless, these 
scholars contend that conduct not historically deemed competition on 
the merits-such as exclusive dealing contracts, refusals to deal, and 
the like-is currently and properly judged under a purchaser welfare 
standard, even if courts judge unilateral conduct such as pricing deci-
sions by something akin to a total welfare standard.309 Indeed, some 
have even asserted that the safe harbor for competition on the merits 
in the form of above-cost pricing and similar conduct is entirely con-
sistent with a purchaser welfare balancing test and that the defendant-
friendly nature of this safe harbor simply reflects judicial concern 
about the negative impact on purchaser welfare of more aggressive 
scrutiny of such conduct.310 Thus, these scholars argue, once a plaintiff 
demonstrates that conduct falling outside the safe harbor produces 
anticompetitive harm, courts can and should balance any benefits that 
the conduct produces against the simultaneously-produced harms and 
ban that conduct which injures purchasers.311 Under this approach, 
308 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 780-84 (conceding that Areeda-Turner test is 
current test for pricing behavior); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: 
Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 464-65 (2006) (asserting that current rules governing pricing and 
product improvement rest on rejection of purchaser welfare approach). 
309 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 781-83, 785-800 (contending that so-called 
"no economic sense" test is rooted in Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing and arguing 
that courts should apply purchaser welfare balancing test to exclusive dealing contracts); 
Lao, supra note 7, at 452-62 (advocating lenient analysis of predatory pricing and product 
development claims and arguing in favor of purchaser welfare balancing test for analysis of 
monopolist's distribution restraints); Popofsky, supra note 308, at 441-48 (contending that 
section 2 doctrine reflects spectrum whereby certain forms of conduct should receive more 
intrusive scrutiny than others); id. at 465 (opining that purchaser welfare balancing test is 
not always improper). 
310 See Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (arguing that case-specific analysis of such con-
duct is difficult, error-prone, and thus likely to undermine incentives to compete and lead 
to harm to consumers over long term). 
311 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 799-801 (arguing that section 2 should ban 
exclusive dealing contracts by monopolists whenever harm to purchasers outweighs bene-
fits and leads to higher prices); Lao, supra note 7, at 456-62 (advocating purchaser welfare 
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section 2 doctrine would effectively reflect one welfare standard for 
some conduct and another welfare standard for other conduct. 
These scholars do not assert that Congress actually contemplated 
such a bifurcated welfare standard within section 2.312 Instead, they 
apparently assert that the safe harbor for competition on the merits is 
a narrowly tailored departure from the presumptive purchaser welfare 
standard that otherwise governs section 2 of the Sherman Act. This 
safe harbor, some say, is justified by the unambiguous and tangible 
benefits of the sort of conduct that courts define as competition on the 
merits, including low prices, product improvements, advertising, pro-
motion, and the like.313 Rigorous application of a purchaser welfare 
standard to such conduct, it is said, would unduly chill procompetitive 
conduct and actually reduce the welfare of purchasers as well as the 
welfare of society as a whole.314 Thus, it is said, the application of 
relaxed standards to generally beneficial conduct does not reflect an 
overall embrace of a total welfare principle. 
This claim ignores the intellectual roots of the safe harbor, which 
the Harvard School developed and endorsed as a means of furthering 
total welfare and not the welfare of purchasers.315 In any event, there 
are several more fundamental reasons to reject the claim that the safe 
harbor for competition on the merits is merely an exception to a 
larger purchaser welfare principle embraced by section 2 doctrine. For 
one thing, this claim appears inconsistent with actual section 2 doc-
trine, which provides a safe harbor for some conduct not deemed 
competition on the merits. Moreover, such a bifurcated standard 
would offend the basic antitrust principle that doctrinal distinctions 
should rest upon economic substance, and not formalistic line 
drawing, by subjecting economically indistinguishable practices to 
varying section 2 standards. Finally, this approach contravenes the 
most recent Supreme Court decision examining exclusionary contracts 
balancing test for analysis of monopolist's distribution restraints such as tying and exclusive 
dealing contracts). 
312 Indeed, Professor Salop would apply the consumer welfare effect standard to all 
practices governed by section 2. See Salop, supra note 3, at 336-43 (arguing for broad 
applicability by addressing common concerns about consumer welfare effect standard). 
313 See Jacobson & Sher, supra note 5, at 781-83 (arguing that Areeda-Turner test for 
predatory pricing was premised on fear that more intrusive test would unduly deter 
procompetitive price cuts); Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (contending that safe harbor 
treatment is lintited to situations in which case-specific search for net economic effects 
would be difficult and error-prone). 
314 See, e.g., Popofsky, supra note 308, at 465 (explaining that risk of error leads to false 
positives that chill innovation). 
315 See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text (describing Harvard School origins of 
safe harbor for competition on merits and its focus on total welfare). 
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entered by a monopolist, a decision that can only be explained as an 
effort to implement a total welfare standard. 
1. The Scope of Section 2's Safe Harbor 
The "bifurcated standards" explanation for the lax treatment of 
competition on the merits would predict relatively searching scrutiny 
for refusals to deal by monopolists, since such conduct is not competi-
tion on the merits as defined by courts. And in fact, some proponents 
of a purchaser welfare balancing test have advocated such an intrusive 
approach to refusals to deaJ.316 
The actual state of the law, however, is quite different. One need 
look no further than Aspen Skiing: That case did not involve tradi-
tional competition on the merits, but rather the sort of refusal to deal 
that some scholars would analyze under a more intrusive purchaser 
welfare standard. In Aspen Skiing, however, the Supreme Court 
approved a jury instruction that distinguished between monopoly 
gained or fortified by conduct motivated by "legitimate business rea-
sons," on the one hand, and that gained or maintained by conduct that 
"unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors, on the other."317 
The instruction did not distinguish between competition on the merits 
and refusals to deal, instead providing that a monopolist would avoid 
liability if it could adduce a "valid business reason[]" for its refusaJ.318 
And the Court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff precisely because 
the defendant could not adduce such a justification.319 Later in the 
opinion, the Court quoted from the Areeda-Turner treatise, which 
advocated a safe harbor for competition on the merits as well as con-
duct that "further[ed]" such competition.320 The Court applied the 
same test in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, which also 
involved refusals to deal, relying upon Aspen Skiing for the proposi-
tion that proof of benefits would avoid liability under section 2, sub-
316 See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text; see also Steven C. Salop, Testimony 
Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Avoiding Error in the Antitrust Analysis 
of Unilateral Refusals To Deal 6-7 (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt. 
ed u/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Salop _Sta temen t_Revised% 209-21. pdf (advocating 
application of purchaser welfare balancing test to refusals to deal). But see Lao, supra note 
7, at 454-55 (advocating lenient analysis of refusals to deal despite support for purchaser 
welfare test in other contexts). 
317 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 (1985). 
318 /d. at 597. 
319 /d. at 608-11. 
320 /d. at 605 n.32. 
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ject only to a no-less-restrictive-alternative limitation.321 Lower courts 
have applied the same test.322 
Perhaps, though, proponents of the purchaser welfare standard 
have simply drawn the line in the wrong place. That is, perhaps the 
law (properly) treats all unilateral conduct, including refusals to deal, 
with relative laxity, while subjecting concerted action, such as exclu-
sive dealing and tying contracts, to greater scrutiny of the sort more 
consistent with a purchaser welfare balancing test.323 Indeed, the line 
between competition on the merits, on the one hand, and refusals to 
deal, on the other, is not particularly precise. After all, a firm cannot 
realize economies of scale or create a superior product unless it can 
decline to sell its output at cost, or even at a monopoly price, to 
rivals.324 
Any effort to explain away the lax treatment of unilateral con-
duct as some sort of anomaly is still destined to fail, however. For one 
thing, the line between refusals to deal and concerted action is by no 
means bright. In Aspen itself, the defendant's refusal to deal was 
simply a bargaining technique designed to convince the plaintiff to 
accept a smaller share of the fruits of their joint venture.325 The plain-
tiff balked at accepting this proposal and sued instead.326 What looked 
like a simple refusal to deal was in fact an effort to reach an agree-
ment allocating the fruits of joint investments, perhaps in a manner 
that would have prevented free riding by the plaintiff.327 
In any event, any exception for unilateral conduct would seem to 
dwarf the supposed general rule. If Ronald Coase and Phillip Areeda 
are correct, most economic activity is unilateral; that is, it takes place 
within the boundaries of individual firms.328 Indeed, this assumption 
321 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992). 
322 See Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(stating that plaintiff's inability to show proferred business justifications were pretextual 
doomed its case); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 284 (2d Cir. 
1979) (holding that business justification will save otherwise anticompetitive behavior). 
323 See Lao, supra note 7, at 451-56 (suggesting this approach). 
324 Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals To Deal, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 81, 96 
(2006); see also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 (noting that competition on merits includes 
refusals to deal); Areeda & Turner, supra note 223, at 707 (contending that monopoly 
profits can provide incentives that encourage beneficial conduct). 
325 See Meese, supra note 324, at 102-05 (suggesting that it was Highlands, not Ski Co., 
that refused to deal). 
326 See id. (describing breakdown of negotiations). 
327 See id. at 105-11 (pointing out that Ski Co. may have insisted upon changed revenue 
allocation formula in order to deter free riding by Highlands). 
328 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw Cj[ 1462a (2d ed. 
2003) ("In most cases the relevant economic actor is the firm ... . ");see also id. Cj[ 1464c, at 
206 ("Conspiracies among unrelated units are relatively infrequent .... "); R.H. Coase, The 
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 713, 714 (1992) ("[M]ost 
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led Professor Areeda to support the Supreme Court's conclusion that 
purely unilateral conduct falls outside of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Areeda believed that subjecting all such conduct to section 1 
scrutiny would overburden the antitrust enforcement machinery and 
subject myriad business decisions to judicial scrutiny, without regard 
to the market share of the defendant.329 Thus, any doctrinal distinc-
tion between unilateral conduct (including refusals to deal), on the 
one hand, and concerted action, on the other, would leave most con-
duct by monopolists beyond the scope of the supposedly presumptive 
purchaser welfare standard.330 If there is a difference in the normative 
standard applied to unilateral conduct, on the one hand, and con-
certed action on the other, then the purchaser welfare standard would 
be the exception and not the rule-not the other way around-and an 
exception that would require additional justification. 
2. The Illusory Economic Distinction Between Unilateral Conduct 
and Concerted Action 
One should not lightly attribute such a bifurcated welfare stan-
dard to antitrust courts. After all, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
stated that doctrinal distinctions under the Sherman Act should rest 
upon economic realities and not formalistic line drawing.331 At times 
the Court has gone even further, holding that disparate treatment of 
economically similar conduct requires courts to overrule the decision 
resources in a modern economic system are employed within firms .... "); cf. Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-77 (1984) (holding that conduct 
undertaken by single firm is "unilateral" and thus not "concerted" action subject to section 
1 of Sherman Act). 
329 See AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 328, <J[ 1462a ("[S]ubjecting virtually every 
decision made within a firm to Sherman Act § 1 scrutiny would not only overtax the limits 
of our antitrust enforcement institutions, it would also involve judges and commissioners 
with the daily business decisions of every firm."). 
330 To be sure, the relative scarcity of concerted action by monopolists could in part 
reflect relatively lax treatment of unilateral conduct under section 2, which could induce 
monopolists to perform tasks internally they might otherwise have left to the market. See 
Alan J. Meese, lntrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REv. 5, 30-31 
(2004) (explaining how relatively lax scrutiny of otherwise identical conduct can induce 
firms to integrate forward, thereby transforming activity that was once "concerted action" 
into "unilateral conduct"). 
331 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466--67 
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market 
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-24 (1988) (stating that economic realities should define bounda-
ries of per se rule, even if those realities require departure from long-established prece-
dents); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-58 (1977) (rejecting 
distinction between consignment and other agreements made by prior case law as formal-
istic and inconsistent with economic reality). 
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creating the anomaly.332 Finally, the Court has perceptively noted that 
disparate treatment of similar forms of concerted and unilateral action 
may cause firms to integrate forward, foregoing more efficient con-
certed action simply to avoid more intrusive antitrust scrutiny.333 
It is certainly possible to draw a formal line between unilateral 
conduct, such as refusals to deal and other conduct that hampers 
rivals. Yet there does not appear to be any economic substance sup-
porting enhanced and more hostile scrutiny of the latter than of the 
former. Such a distinction may well have made sense fifty years ago, 
when neoclassical price theory and its workable competition model 
supplied the sole method for interpreting the causes and consequences 
of nonstandard agreements like exclusive dealing and tying contracts 
entered by monopolists. According to price theory and workable com-
petition, individual firms made the economy's allocational decisions 
after observing relevant prices in input and output markets. A firm 
also realized technological efficiencies within its own boundaries, 
purchasing inputs in the spot market and transforming them into out-
puts.334 At the same time, the workable competition model could not 
identify any beneficial purposes for concerted action between two or 
more firms, at least none that parties could not achieve via less restric-
tive means.335 This intellectual milieu supported a judicial hostility 
toward exclusionary agreements that manifested itself in decisions 
such as Grinnell and United Shoe, both of which condemned nonstan-
dard agreements entered by monopolists, without regard to any justi-
fications the defendants might offer.336 
The workable competition model's hostility toward nonstandard 
agreements could readily support a bifurcated approach to different 
forms of conduct alleged to be exclusionary. After all, if conduct not 
deemed competition on the merits both threatens purchaser welfare 
and only rarely produces benefits, then more searching scrutiny of 
332 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that disparate treatment of consignment and 
other agreements resulting in territorial exclusivity required reconsideration of precedent 
creating such distinction). 
333 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1997) (explaining that per se rule 
against concerted maximum price fixing had induced firms to integrate forward to avoid 
such scrutiny). 
334 See OuvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS oF CAPITALISM 371 
(1985) (explaining that, during this era, economists believed that "true economies take a 
technological form, [and] hence are fully realized within firms" and so, according to price-
theoretic paradigm, "there is nothing to be gained by introducing nonstandard terms into 
market-mediated exchange"). 
335 See Meese, supra note 63, at 115-19 (documenting and explaining applied price 
theory's hostility toward nonstandard contracts). 
336 See supra notes 198-218 and accompanying text (discussing workable competition 
theory and its impact on Grinnell and United Shoe). 
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such conduct can protect purchasers from harm without at the same 
time condemning conduct that might enhance purchaser welfare. If 
this is the case, then the cost of falsely condemning such conduct is 
very small indeed. 337 
A bifurcated approach makes far less sense, if any at all, given the 
advent of transaction cost economics (TCE) and its derivative theory 
of the firm.338 TCE teaches that unilateral conduct-including compe-
tition on the merits-is itself the product of concerted action between 
potentially independent and fully autonomous individuals.339 For 
instance, what antitrust treats as a single firm's decision to price above 
its costs but below those of its rivals is, according to TCE, an agree-
ment between the firm's owners, who control the firm's property, and 
its employees, whom the owners contractually empower to sell the 
firm's property at a given price.340 Such an agreement is, in economic 
substance, indistinguishable from an agreement between two 
vertically-related independent firms to reduce prices.341 The same is 
true for a firm's decision to increase or decrease output.342 Further, a 
firm's decision to advertise and promote its own products, but not 
those of its rivals, is also the result of such an agreement. Finally, a 
franchisor that integrates forward and then directs its outlets to 
purchase particular inputs does so pursuant to contracts between the 
337 See Meese, supra note 63, at 124-34 (describing inhospitable case law during period). 
Put more technically, in these circumstances, the cost of false positives is low. 
338 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 334 (describing TCE and its explanation of 
firm organization as means of reducing transaction costs); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (same). 
339 See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-5 
(1983) (explaining that firm is simply nexus of contracts among individual factors of pro-
duction); Coase, supra note 338, at 388 (same). 
340 See Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(analogizing minimum resale price maintenance agreements to managers of Sears telling 
employees what price to charge for goods); see also Coase, supra note 338, at 391 
(explaining that firm is merely contract whereby employees agree to follow owner's 
instructions, within certain limits). 
341 Cf. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (evaluating max-
imum resale price agreement between gasoline manufacturer and retailers); see also Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886 (1981) (arguing for aban-
donment of per se invalidity of maximum price-fixing agreements). 
342 See Chi. Prori Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593,598 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that, under current law, "the producers of Star Trek may decide to release two episodes a 
week and grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though this reduces the number of 
times episodes appear on TV"); Ill. Corporate Travel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751, 
753-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding airline's ban on advertisement of discounted prices lawful 
per se because "travel service operators are the air carriers' agents"); Ill. Corporate Travel, 
806 F.2d at 727 (explaining how contractual ban on price cutting by travel agents was anal-
ogous to "Sears ... tell[ing] the managers of its stores what prices to charge"). 
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firm's owners and those that operate its outlets.343 Indeed, any time a 
firm other than a sole proprietorship without employees "acts" (or 
declines to act), it does so pursuant to agreements between partici-
pants in the venture-agreements that are always closely analogous to 
other arrangements that courts treat as concerted action.344 What anti-
trust law treats as unilateral conduct is in fact the result of nonstan-
dard agreements that devotees of purchaser welfare would subject to 
enhanced scrutiny.34s 
At the same time, TCE also explained that concerted action in 
the form of partial contractual integration could overcome "market 
failures" that unbridled rivalry would otherwise produce.346 For 
instance, some have argued that exclusive territories ancillary to oth-
erwise lawful ventures could prevent venture members from free 
riding on promotional expenditures by fellow venturers.347 Thus, such 
restraints would ensure that independent dealers would replicate the 
amount and type of promotion that completely integrated firms would 
produce.348 
Not all such agreements produce significant benefits. Nonethe-
less, there is very good reason to believe that, in fact, most nonstan-
dard agreements are properly deemed beneficial or benign. As noted 
earlier, the firm itself is a sort of nonstandard contract, indeed, a 
nexus of nonstandard contracts.349 Since most industries are uncon-
centrated or have low barriers to entry, it stands to reason that eco-
nomic agents have adopted these arrangements for the purpose of 
343 See Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Con-
tract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223, 231-32 (1978) (criticizing antitrust intervention in franchising 
contracts because there is no economic distinction between franchisor-franchisee relation-
ship and employer-employee relationship). 
344 See Meese, supra note 330, at 57-64 (criticizing disparate treatment of "internal" 
firm conduct and agreements between firms); cf Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (conceding that activity within firm can be characterized as 
agreement between firm's various participants). 
345 See Meese, supra note 330, at 59 ("As a result, what economists and antitrust 
scholars deem 'a firm,' capable of 'unilateral action,' is in fact a 'nexus of contracts' 
between various individuals that supply labor, capital, and other inputs in pursuit of an 
economic objective."). 
346 See Meese, supra note 63, at 134-41 (explaining how partial contractual integration 
can overcome costs of relying upon atomistic competition to conduct economic activity). 
347 See Bork, Rule of Reason II, supra note 73, at 430-38 (explaining how exclusive 
territories can encourage promotional expenditures by dealers by overcoming free rider 
problem). 
348 See Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56, at 434-35. 
349 See supra notes 338-45 and accompanying text; see also Cheung, supra note 339, at 
5-6 (explaining employment contract as organizational form that minimizes transaction 
costs). 
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mimmlZlng costs-not to exercise market power.350 To be sure, 
numerous nonstandard agreements bind two or more independent 
firms. Here again, however, there appears to be no evidence estab-
lishing or even suggesting that most such agreements arise in markets 
structured in a manner conducive to the acquisition or maintenance of 
market power. In fact, the vast majority of rule-of-reason claims fail 
for lack of proof that the restraint produces harm.351 
Of course, where section 2 is involved, courts will not inquire into 
the effects-pro or con-of a monopolist's conduct unless the plaintiff 
first proves that, in fact, the defendant possesses monopoly power.352 
However, the mere fact that a defendant is a monopolist is no reason 
to assume that all or most of its practices reflect anything other than 
efforts to minimize costs. Even proponents of a purchaser welfare 
standard have conceded that firms may obtain and maintain a 
monopoly through benign conduct.353 Indeed, as Herbert Hovenkamp 
has explained, even firms that become dominant by means of exclu-
sionary conduct usually also engage in conduct that is procompetitive 
in some respects.354 It is easier to maintain a monopoly if you are also 
selling an attractive product.355 Thus, the mere fact that a monopolist 
350 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979) (finding 
that fact that challenged restraint had also been adopted by firms without market power 
militated in favor of rule-of-reason scrutiny); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van 
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (holding that absence of market 
power by parties to challenged agreement requires inference that restraint produces bene-
fits); see also Coase, supra note 338, at 394-95 (arguing that competition between market 
actors will result in optimal degree of contractual integration). 
351 See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 
BYU L. REv. 1265, 1268 (reporting that eighty-four percent of rule-of-reason cases studied 
in exhaustive survey failed at initial stage because of lack of proof of anticompetitive 
harm). 
352 See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956) 
(stating that proof of monopoly power is necessary to establish unlawful monopolization). 
353 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (noting formative era assumption 
that efficient conduct could lead to at least temporary monopoly). 
354 HoVENKAMP, supra note 88, at 197 ("It is usually very difficult for a nondominant 
firm to become dominant simply by doing anticompetitive things. In most cases such firms 
also have superior products or lower costs than their rivals, at least during the period when 
their monopoly is developing."). Indeed, in the Microsoft case, both the government and 
the courts had trouble distinguishing between the impact of plainly procompetitive con-
duct, such as product improvements and low prices, on the one hand, and exclusive dealing 
and tying contracts, on the ot:ter. Both categories of conduct tended to increase 
Microsoft's market share at the expense of Netscape's share. It bas been suggested that 
Microsoft's efforts to thwart Netscape's so-called middleware strategy might have suc-
ceeded even absent any of the conduct that the courts found to be unlawful. See Meese, 
supra note 153, at 769-70. 
355 Microsoft may well provide an example of this phenomenon. While the firm may 
have engaged in anticompetitive conduct properly condemned under section 2, there is no 
dispute that the firm had also engaged in a significant amount of beneficial conduct. 
Indeed, when reviewing a consent decree proposed by the United States, the D.C. Circuit 
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has entered an exclusive dealing contract, for instance, is no reason to 
presume that the arrangement is anything other than a "normal" or 
"ordinary" practice that reduces costs.356 Indeed, one proponent of a 
purchaser welfare approach to unilateral conduct has, in other con-
texts, explained that the existence of a concentrated market is simply 
one of several conditions necessary for a successful effort to raise the 
costs of one's rivals and thus acquire or protect market power.35 7 
The insights offered by TCE would seem to undermine the case 
for the application of a more forgiving standard to competition on the 
merits and other unilateral conduct challenged under section 2. Like 
partial contractual integration, for instance, a unilateral refusal to deal 
can deprive a monopolist's rivals of key inputs. Both also presump-
tively produce significant benefits, and mistaken condemnation will 
injure purchasers in the relevant market as well as the rest of society. 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that courts have any special 
competence in distinguishing harmful concerted action from that 
which produces benefits. Indeed, history is replete with instances in 
which courts-and even expert enforcement agencies-condemned 
agreements that likely produced benefits, often in spite of defendants' 
explanations of the restraints' beneficial consequences.358 Thus, any 
disparate treatment of unilateral exclusionary conduct, on the one 
emphasized that it did not disagree with the assertion by the United States that Microsoft 
had obtained its monopoly by means of lawful, procompetitive conduct. United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Brief for Appellant United 
States at 4, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Nos. 95-5037, 95-5039) ("[T]here was 
no basis for an antitrust challenge to Microsoft's acquisition of monopoly power in the 
market for operating system software for IBM-compatible personal computers .... "). 
Moreover, the government supported its assertion with an affidavit from Nobel Laureate 
Kenneth Arrow. See Declaration of Kenneth Arrow at 11, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (No. 95-5037), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/2517.pdf ("Clearly, 
the six-fold growth in the installed base [of consumers using the Windows Operating 
System] is primarily the result of the extraordinary commercial success of the IBM-
compatible PC platform, in which Microsoft's product development and marketing played 
a part."). 
356 See supra notes 340-50 and accompanying text. 
357 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 253-66 (discussing numerous necessary 
conditions for sucessful strategy of raising rivals' costs). 
358 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 602-08 (1972) (declaring hori-
zontal division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se); cf Brief 
for Topco Assocs., Inc. at 21-23, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) 
(No. 70-82) (explaining in intricate detail how restraints in question counteracted free 
riding (citing Bork, Rule of Reason I, supra note 56)); see also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 
U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (finding that exclusive dealing contract involving only one percent 
of nation's shoe retailers offended "the central policy of ... the Sherman Act" that all 
market segments be open to all competitors). Moreover, in some cases, defendants them-
selves may not be able to explain the rationale for the challenged conduct. See 
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 5-6 (stating that defendants often do not know why given 
practice is successful, only that it is). 
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hand, and that which flows from concerted action, on the other, would 
seem to rest on "formalistic line drawing" and not on the respective 
economic consequences of such conduct.359 Therefore, one would not 
expect well-considered section 2 doctrine to reflect disparate treat-
ment of some forms of purported exclusion. 
3. The Supreme Court's Rejection of a Bifurcated Standard 
One need not rely upon these more theoretical arguments, how-
ever, to reject the "bifurcation" account of current law. It seems abso-
lutely plain that courts, including the Supreme Court, have rejected 
the proffered distinction between unilateral conduct and concerted 
action. Put another way, the standards that courts apply to both sets of 
conduct entail a rejection of a purchaser welfare standard. If there 
were any doubt on this question, the Supreme Court resolved it in 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.360 There, the 
defendant, with a market share of over ninety percent, allegedly 
employed tying contracts (concerted action) and refusals to deal (uni-
lateral conduct) to maintain its monopoly share of the market.361 The 
Supreme Court articulated the uniform standard governing the defen-
dant's conduct as entailing two elements: "(1) the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or devel-
opment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident."362 After finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the 
first element by proving monopoly power, the Court fleshed out the 
second element of the offense, defining it as "the use of monopoly 
power 'to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or 
to destroy a competitor.' "363 
The Court then applied this standard in light of the evidence of 
tying and refusals to deal that the plaintiff had adduced in response to 
the summary judgment motion. The Court opined that the plaintiff's 
evidence would support a finding that "Kodak took exclusionary 
action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts 
to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market. "364 
Given this conclusion, the Court said: "Liability turns, then, on 
359 See supra note 331 and accompanying text (collecting authorities for proposition that 
distinctions drawn by antitrust doctrine should not rest on formalistic line drawing). 
360 504 u.s. 451 (1992). 
361 /d. at 456-58. 
362 /d. at 481 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). 
363 /d. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948)). 
364 /d. at 483. 
June 2010] DEBUNKING THE PURCHASER WELFARE ACCOUNT 731 
whether 'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions."365 The 
Court reiterated this point in a footnote, citing Aspen Skiing for the 
proposition that a monopolist could refuse to deal with its rivals when-
ever "there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal. "366 
Aspen Skiing, of course, had derived its test from the Areeda-Turner 
treatise. 367 
According to this Harvard-inspired valid business reasons test, 
undisputed proof that the refusals to deal and tying contracts pro-
duced significant benefits would have entitled Kodak to summary 
judgment.368 This was so even though the plaintiff's evidence showed 
(and Kodak did not dispute) that the refusals and tying excluded the 
plaintiffs from the market and strengthened Kodak's monopoly "share 
of the Kodak service market. "369 The Court did not suggest that the 
finder of fact should balance any benefits of Kodak's conduct against 
the harms produced by such exclusion or the strengthening of its 
monopoly power. Nor did the Court suggest or imply that the analysis 
should turn on the conduct's impact on price.370 Instead, the question 
was simply whether the restraint produced benefits. 
The Court did add one caveat to the valid business reasons test, a 
caveat that actually confirms its implicit rejection of the purchaser 
welfare standard: In applying the test to the evidence that Kodak 
adduced, the Court employed a less restrictive alternative standard. 
Thus, even though Kodak brought forth evidence that its conduct pro-
duced some benefits, the Court nonetheless rejected Kodak's bid for 
summary judgment, because there was evidence that Kodak could 
have achieved the very same objectives by means of a less restrictive 
alternative.371 Of course, the invocation of such an alternative 
depends upon an assumption that the benefits of the restraint necessa-
rily coexist with its harms; otherwise there would be no reason to 
assume the restraint is "restrictive" and require the defendant to 
achieve these benefits via other means.372 
365 /d. Ironically, the Court cited Alcoa for this proposition. 
366 /d. at 483 n.32. 
367 See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text. 
368 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-85 (discussing benefits that Kodak attributed to 
its conduct). 
369 /d. at 483. 
370 Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (holding 
that benefits purportedly produced by restraint did not counterbalance harms for purposes 
of section 1 rule-of-reason analysis given factual finding that restraint resulted in prices 
higher than they otherwise would have been). 
371 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-86. 
372 Meese, supra note 153, at 761; see also Meese, supra note 63, at 168 ("An assertion 
that alternatives are more competitive depends upon the assumption that the restraints in 
question actually injure competition in the first place."). 
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Still, despite this assumption that any benefits coexist with harms, 
the Court nonetheless eschewed balancing, making it plain that proof 
of benefits that could not be achieved in some other way would entitle 
Kodak to judgment in its favor. Such an approach stands in stark con-
trast to that employed in the section 1 context, where courts often at 
least say that they will "balance" or "weigh" any of a restraint's bene-
fits against its harms.373 Thus, Eastman Kodak cannot be squared with 
a purchaser welfare balancing test. 
Lower courts have repeatedly employed a Kodak-like standard 
when evaluating alleged exclusionary agreements. Consider the Third 
Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Dentsply International, 
Inc. 374 There the United States challenged a series of exclusive 
dealing contracts under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Third 
Circuit found that the defendant possessed a monopoly and that the 
challenged agreements had "a significant effect in preserving [the 
defendant's] monopoly."375 The court repeated its earlier assertion 
that the defendant could nonetheless prevail if it established a "busi-
ness justification."376 The court did not mention any requirement that 
the benefits of the justified behavior outweigh the harms produced by 
the restraint or that the restraint result in any particular price level.377 
B. Microsoft 
What, though, about the Microsoft decision,378 which some cite as 
evidence for a purchaser welfare balancing test?379 There the United 
States challenged numerous tactics that Microsoft employed to disad-
vantage Netscape, then the leading seller of Internet browsers. Such 
tactics included tying agreements, primary dealing contracts, and a 
policy of giving Microsoft's browser away for free.3so After affirming 
the trial court's finding that Microsoft possessed monopoly power, the 
D.C. Circuit went on to articulate "a general rule for distinguishing 
373 See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1998) ("[T]he harms and 
benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged 
behavior is, on balance, reasonable." (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw ')[1502 
(1986})). But see infra note 404 (noting that more than ninety percent of rule-of-reason 
cases involve no balancing whatsoever). 
374 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
375 /d. at 191. 
376 Id. at 196. 
377 /d. at 196-97; see also Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 786-88 
(6th Cir. 2002) (articulating defense for legitimate business justification); Trans Sport, Inc. 
v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). 
378 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
379 See, e.g., Salop, supra note 3, at 333-34. 
380 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-78 (describing and evaluating various challenged 
practices). 
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between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competi-
tive acts, which increase it. "381 According to the court, sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act each implement "similar" standards of liability .382 
The court then articulated a test similar in form to that employed 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.383 That is, once a plaintiff makes 
out a prima facie case that the challenged conduct is exclusionary, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to "proffer a 'procompetitive justifica-
tion' for its conduct."384 Such a justification, the court said, would 
require a "nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of 
competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater 
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal .... "385 If the defendant does 
assert such a benefit, the court said, the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to rebut that claim.386 If the plaintiff cannot rebut that claim 
(that is, if the defendant's conduct in fact produces some benefits), 
then the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that "the anticompeti-
tive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit. "387 
The balancing test that courts employ under section 1 of the Act at 
least purports to condemn restraints that reduce purchaser welfare, 
leading some to claim that Microsoft meant to employ a similar nor-
mative premise under section 2.388 
As an initial matter, the D.C. Circuit has no authority to reject 
the standard announced in Eastman Kodak and Aspen Skiing, even if 
it believes that standard to be incorrect and that the Supreme Court 
itself would abandon that standard upon further examination.389 In 
any event, nothing in the Microsoft decision implies the embrace of a 
purchaser welfare standard to the exclusion of a total welfare stan-
dard. To be sure, the opinion speaks of balancing anticompetitive 
harms against procompetitive benefits. In this sense, the opinion 
departs from Eastman Kodak, Aspen Skiing, and other decisions that 
eschew such weighing of costs and benefits.390 However, the language 
in question may technically be dicta, since the court did not actually 
engage in such balancing even though it evaluated numerous allegedly 
381 /d. at 58. 
382 /d. at 59. 
383 /d. 
384 /d. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 
(1992)). 
385 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
386 /d. 
387 /d. 
388 See Salop, supra note 3, at 333-34 (arguing that D.C. Circuit adopted purchaser wel-
fare balancing test in Microsoft). 
389 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (stating that lower courts should 
adhere to Supreme Court precedents even if they believe Court will reverse itself). 
390 See supra notes 248-67 and accompanying text. 
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exclusionary practices.391 Moreover, a standard requiring the weighing 
of costs against benefits simply raises the question of how exactly to 
define and measure these competing effects. Under a total welfare 
approach, for instance, the finder of fact would balance the benefits 
produced by the conduct against the harm in the form of any dead-
weight allocative loss produced by enhanced market power.392 A pur-
chaser welfare approach, by contrast, would entail balancing the 
efficiency effects of the restraint against any reduction in purchaser 
welfare caused by market power, focusing on the price resulting from 
the challenged activities.393 
While the Microsoft court was not entirely clear on this question, 
the opinion seemed to take a total welfare approach.394 For one thing, 
the court began its discussion of the definition of "anticompetitive 
conduct" by endorsing the safe harbor for the creation of a "superior 
product, business acumen, or historical accident," without balancing 
the benefits of such conduct against harms or otherwise seeking to 
determine the impact of such conduct on the welfare of purchasers.395 
The Court also quoted, with approval, the dicta from Alcoa to the 
effect that "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to com-
pete, must not be turned upon when he wins."396 Moreover, the court 
described its task-and that of any antitrust court-as "distinguishing 
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competi-
tive acts, which increase it."397 To be sure, the court held that proof of 
an anticompetitive effect requires proof that a practice "harm[s] the 
competitive process and thereby harm[ s] consumers. "398 Such proof, 
however, was merely a necessary condition for liability, sufficient only 
to establish a prima facie case.399 Defendants could rebut such a case, 
the court said, by proving that the conduct was in fact "a form of com-
petition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater effi-
ciency or enhanced consumer appeal .... "400 Even if the defendant 
391 See Gavil, supra note 8, at 22-23 (arguing that Microsoft court did not engage in 
balancing when analyzing Microsoft's conduct). 
392 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
393 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
394 See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 153 (opining that Microsoft formulation, while 
"elaborate ... is also fairly unfocused, in that it does not specify criteria for harm to 
competition or the competitive process"); Gavil, supra note 8, at 23 ("Microsoft offers little 
specific guidance on how [the] balance should be struck."). 
395 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
396 /d. at 58 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 
1945)). 
397 /d. (emphasis added). 
398 !d. (emphasis omitted). 
399 See id. at 58-59. 
400 /d. at 59 (emphasis added). 
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proves such benefits, the plaintiff could still prevail by proving that 
the restraint's harms outweigh its benefits.401 Nowhere does the court 
define "harm" for this purpose as harm to purchasers in the relevant 
market, nor does it equate the "social" welfare expressly embraced by 
the opinion with the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market-a 
mere subset of society. Indeed, the court's reference to a rebuttal 
based upon enhanced efficiency without regard to whether such effi-
ciencies were passed on to consumers would seem to reflect a total 
welfare standard. In short, there is little evidence to support the claim 
that the Microsoft court somehow departed from the Supreme Court's 
focus on total welfare. 
Finally, section 1's seeming reliance on a purchaser welfare stan-
dard does not compel a different result. Microsoft itself merely opined 
that its test was "similar" to that employed under section 1.402 And 
even under section 1, actual balancing is rare indeed. Data suggest 
that most rule-of-reason cases fail because plaintiffs cannot prove that 
the challenged restraint produces harm in the first place.403 Even 
when plaintiffs succeed in making out a prima facie case of harm, bal-
ancing is still exceedingly rare; proof that a restraint produces benefits 
that could not be achieved in a different manner nearly always entitles 
the defendant to judgment.404 
In any event, recognition that courts have embraced different 
normative standards under sections 1 and 2 respectively does not 
thereby establish that the standard currently articulated (but almost 
never applied) under section 1 should prevail. One might just as well 
assert that section 2's standard, including its safe harbor for "normal" 
conduct, should control. This was, after all, the test originally 
announced under the rule of reason.405 Further, if, as suggested ear-
lier, most economic activity is in fact unilateral in nature, and there-
fore not subject to section 1, the total welfare standard currently 
governs most business behavior. Perhaps this Article's conclusions 
401 !d.; see also id. at 67 ("The plaintiff bears the burden not only of rebutting a prof-
fered justification but also of demonstrating that the anticompetitive effect of the chal-
lenged action outweighs [the procompetitive benefits]."). 
402 See id. at 59. 
403 See Carrier, supra note 351, at 1268 (reporting after exhaustive survey that eighty-
four percent of rule-of-reason cases fail for lack of proof of anticompetitive harm); see also 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 34, at 278 (asserting that consideration of efficiencies 
under rule of reason generally entails "subjecting assertions of anticompetitive effects to 
close scrutiny," not balancing). 
404 Carrier, supra note 351, at 1267-68, 1272-73, 1349-57 (reporting that only four per-
cent of rule-of-reason cases, in sample of nearly five hundred cases, entailed actual bal-
ancing of harms against benefits and reporting that only one rule-of-reason case in 
previous four years entailed actual balancing of harms and benefits). 
405 See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text. 
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about the source and durability of section 2's total welfare standard 
should cause courts to reassess their apparent commitment to pro-
tecting purchasers instead of society in that small subset of cases gov-
erned by section 1. 
CoNcLusioN 
Before offering to reform the law, one first needs to know what 
the law is. Several antitrust scholars and lawyers have recently argued 
that the case law under section 2 of the Sherman Act reflects a pur-
chaser welfare approach to antitrust-that is, an effort to maximize 
the welfare of those individuals who happen to purchase in the market 
purportedly monopolized by the defendant. Some of these same 
scholars claim that support for the alternative total welfare account 
originated with the Chicago School of antitrust analysis and that only 
Chicagoans support such a standard. 
The choice between these two competing normative premises is 
of significant practical import. Selection of a total welfare standard 
implies a safe harbor for competition on the merits and any other con-
duct that makes economic sense separate and apart from any expecta-
tion of acquiring or maintaining monopoly power. Conversely, 
embrace of a purchaser welfare standard would entail application of a 
consumer welfare balancing test. Under this test, courts would balance 
any benefits produced by a challenged practice against its harms, 
judged by the impact of the challenged practice upon the welfare of 
purchasers in the relevant market. Thus, a practice that enhanced the 
overall welfare of society would nonetheless be unlawful if it reduced 
the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market. 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that section 2 doctrine as 
it currently stands reflects a total welfare approach to antitrust law. 
Indeed, no decision of which the author is aware has embraced a pur-
chaser welfare approach to section 2. As a result, embrace of a pur-
chaser welfare standard would call into question numerous decisions 
and resulting legal rules designed to maximize society's welfare-deci-
sions on which myriad firms and individuals have relied. 
This commitment to maximizing total social wealth is not a recent 
phenomenon associated with the Chicago School. Instead, the total 
welfare standard is deeply rooted in section 2 law, tracing its origin to 
the formative era of antitrust law. Furthermore, some scholars have 
overstated the role of Robert Bork and the Chicago School in devel-
oping the total welfare approach. Instead of Chicago, it was the 
Harvard School of antitrust analysis, steeped in neoclassical price 
theory, that led the charge for a total welfare approach to antitrust 
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generally and under section 2 in particular, beginning in the 1950s. 
Since that time, courts have relied upon the work of Harvard scholars 
to justify the application of section 2 tests that reflect a total welfare 
standard to various forms of conduct. Such an approach is not limited 
to competition on the merits or unilateral conduct more generally, but 
instead applies across the board to nonstandard contracts such as 
exclusive dealing and tying as well. Finally, even if a purchaser welfare 
standard were to supply a better account of the original meaning of 
the Sherman Act, considerations of stare decisis counsel strongly 
against jettisoning the total welfare standard. Those who would undo 
this modern consensus bear the heavy burden of explaining why so 
many have been so wrong for so long. 
